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TRUE AND FALSE SPEECH 
Christopher P. Guzelian* 
Abstract: First Amendment law is structurally unstable because it does 
not adequately distinguish true and false speech. Free speech law, there-
fore, is “unpredictable,” meaning that speakers cannot accurately predict 
whether their contemplated speech will suffer sanction. Unpredictable 
law causes the Rule of Law’s collapse. This Article demonstrates that an 
effective first step in improving First Amendment law would be to create 
well-defined liability for false speech. We conclude that, in particular, sci-
entific speech—a form of speech readily determined to be true or false— 
must face additional scrutiny. Anticipating serious objections to formal-
ized false-speech liability, we then show that these objections, interest-
ingly, apply with equal force to any form of legal liability. The implication 
of this fact is that rejection of this Article’s modifications to First Amend-
ment law requires deep reconsideration about how we should administer 
most legal liability, not only First Amendment law. 
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[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. 
—Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) 
Introduction 
 This Article explores the tension between two of the First Amend-
ment’s major goals: protecting speech from legal liability and permit-
ting government-sanctioned liability for false speech.1 To strike the 
appropriate balance of these competing First Amendment interests, 
establishing standards for determining whether a particular speech is 
true or false is essential. This Article demonstrates, however, that 
there is disturbingly little discussion in First Amendment law or litera-
ture about either the need for or the nature of standards that distin-
guish truth and falsity of speech. 
 First Amendment law, like all law, must be predictable to function. 
By predictable, we mean that anyone who could be subjected to liabil-
ity understands prior to acting or speaking what the legal implications 
of her act or speech will likely be. Predictable First Amendment law is 
not possible so long as there is vast disparity and confusion about what 
speech is “true” and what speech is “false.” We accordingly present a 
careful method for determining whether a particular speech is “true” 
or “false.” A major implication of our efforts to establish this method 
is that true scientific speech and false scientific speech should each become 
a stand-alone First Amendment speech category because scientific 
speech is perhaps the best example of a statement of fact. 
 To clarify the distinction between true and false speech, this Arti-
cle must necessarily make other novel proposals. For instance, to de-
termine the truth or falsity of scientific speech, we show that the use 
of systematic rules for appraising the quality of scientific evidence—
collectively called evidence-based rules—is necessary to properly ad-
                                                                                                                      
1 Many people refer to the need to protect “free speech.” The expression “free speech” 
must be defined carefully, but often is not. It can have multiple, mutually exclusive mean-
ings. Under the most extreme understanding of “free speech,” any legal liability for speech 
is, by definition, undercutting “free speech,” and thus every case that upholds a govern-
ment restriction of speech is decried as a dreaded “chilling of speech.” There is another 
understanding of “free speech” that refers to the process of properly balancing the value 
of leaving speech maximally free of liability yet regulating unprotected speech. Under this 
understanding, “chilling of speech” does not occur in every instance when speech regula-
tions by the government are upheld, but only when the balancing of a speech’s harms and 
benefits is improperly conducted. Principled study of settled First Amendment jurispru-
dence reveals that only the latter definition of “free speech” has been judicially recognized. 
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980); 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968). 
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judicate whether a given scientific claim is true or false. Judicial adop-
tion of such evidence-based protocols would largely eliminate reliance 
on scientific expert opinions in court. This Article also scrutinizes the 
current patchwork of rules (such as the famous New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan actual malice standard) by which First Amendment law at-
tempts to prevent “boundless” liability for false speech. Finding this 
hodgepodge of current limitations on false-speech liability to be ei-
ther ineffective or unpredictable, this Article proposes the use of so-
called “predictable negligence” rules, which limit liability to avoidable 
and unnecessary false speech that is empirically demonstrated to have 
resulted in injury. This Article demonstrates that if predictable negli-
gence were to replace current standards such as actual malice, First 
Amendment law will be theoretically better at deterring the most ob-
jectionable instances of false speech while still ensuring adequate free 
speech protections. 
 Unsurprisingly, we anticipate significant objections to the pro-
posed modifications of First Amendment law. Indeed, we ourselves 
present several obvious concerns.2 Nevertheless, this Article demon-
strates that the most serious objections to the proposals apply to any 
form of liability, not just First Amendment cases. Therefore, a reader 
should realize that if one rejects the efforts to clarify true- and false-
speech liability, the necessary alternative is deep reconsideration 
about whether and how most legal liability, not simply First Amend-
ment liability, should be wielded. 
 This Article is sequential—it is best read straight through. Part I 
examines why it is vital in law that liability be predictable,3 and Part II 
explains the need for predictability in a First Amendment context.4 
Part III reveals that defamation, a supposedly well-settled area of First 
Amendment law involving false speech, is actually unpredictable at its 
core.5 Expanding on the previous section, Part IV examines false 
speech in general (not just defamation) and how law that addresses 
false speech can be made predictable.6 Part V then concludes that to 
make First Amendment law more predictable, true and false scientific 
speech in particular should become explicit categories of First 
Amendment speech content, receiving greater and lesser constitu-
                                                                                                                      
2 See infra notes 153–160 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra notes 12–24 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 25–35 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 36–56 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 57–101 and accompanying text. 
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tional protections, respectively.7 Part V also states that to adjudicate 
effectively the truth or falsity of scientific speech, systematic eviden-
tiary rules known as evidence-based rules must replace the current 
system of expert testimony in court.8 Part VI then examines how liabil-
ity can be limited in free speech cases without resorting to the current 
ineffective or unpredictable hodgepodge of legal rules that create 
limitations on liability.9 Part VII points out that those key concepts 
introduced in this Article—those having to do with clarifying true and 
false speech distinctions—are universally applicable concepts for im-
proving the predictability of any form of law, First Amendment or 
otherwise.10 Part VIII indicates that even the most ideally predictable 
liability in theory may not translate to predicted liability in practice.11 As 
a consequence, it is conceded that theoretical improvements to law 
may not cause the public to improve its response to threats of legal 
liability in practice. 
I. Predictable Liability 
 In the 1930s, Nobel Laureate Friedrich Hayek famously cau-
tioned that one thing separates a democracy’s “Rule of Law” from to-
talitarianism: a collective social commitment to enact and respect pre-
dictable laws—laws whose application could be predicted by social 
actors at the time of their actions.12 Predictable law, Hayek said, would 
allow social actors to refrain from unnecessarily and avoidably risky 
behavior.13 Hayek contended that unpredictable laws, by contrast, are 
perceived as (and often are) political instruments designed and used 
to further political ends and cronyism.14 Hayek’s famous insight was 
that the introduction of numerous unpredictable laws ultimately leads 
to the collapse of the Rule of Law in society.15 
 Despite Hayek’s and many others’ lucid advocacy of predictable 
law, some still claim that law properly serves purposes apart from or 
                                                                                                                      
7 See infra notes 102–112 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 102–108 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 113–126 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 128–152 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 153–160 and accompanying text. 
12 F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 54–65 (7th prtg. 1946). Hayek originally referred 
to neutral laws instead of predictable laws. See id. 
13 Id. at 56, 60. 
14 Id. at 56–57. 
15 Id. at 59. 
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even contradictory to predictability.16 At least one scholar in fact con-
tends that law cannot be predictable. Nathan Adams, for instance, has 
recently penned a satire in which a law that restricts driving to the 
right-hand side of the road in the fictional Land of Idd gradually gives 
way to social revolt and fails.17 The reason for this outcome, he says, is 
that there is no objective truth as to “which side [of the road] is the 
correct one to drive on . . . .”18 To Adams, moral relativism is the only 
truth.19 Every law involves arbitrary choices of a standard, and every 
law is therefore unpredictable, meaning that laws are simply a reflec-
tion of the ruling authority’s political whim.20 
 Is Hayek right or is Adams right? Although Adams may be right 
to say that all laws are more or less arbitrary bundles of rules, it does 
not follow, as Professor Eugene Volokh has demonstrated, that all laws 
are equally unpredictable and equally susceptible to “slippery slope” 
collapse because of social, political, and economic self-interests.21 Ad-
ams’s own parable undermines his point: American laws confining 
drivers to the right-hand side of the road have not weakened or col-
lapsed and neither have British laws restricting drivers to the left-hand 
side. Thus, even if laws are always somewhat arbitrary, they need not 
be unpredictable. 
 So if laws can be predictable, what makes them so? We suggest 
that predictability is improved if a law is fashioned wherever possible 
upon relevant objective facts (i.e. knowledge). This is because people 
must be able to ascertain whether their contemplated behavior will 
cause an unnecessary and avoidable risk. Only then can they decide 
whether to modify their behavior to avoid liability for it. We can use 
Adams’s example to make this point: the fact that no two cars can oc-
cupy the same space at the same time compels a lane rule for traffic 
orderliness to avoid the dual risks of gridlock and collisions. If that 
                                                                                                                      
16 See, e.g., infra notes 17–21 and accompanying text. But a modern rise in the number of 
unpredictable laws has caused numerous legal scholars to begin restating Hayek’s caution 
about safeguarding the Rule of Law. See Christopher P. Guzelian, The Kindynamic Theory of 
Tort, 80 Ind. L.J. 987, 990, 1007–09 (2005) [hereinafter Guzelian, Kindynamic Theory] (quot-
ing theorists who reject the concept that legitimate law may have contradictory aims). 
17 Nathan A. Adams, IV, Jurisprudence Without Moral Consensus: Constitutional Arguments 
in Idd for Driving on the Right or Left Side of the Road, 13 Const. Comment. 101, 101–05 
(1996). 
18 Id. at 106. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. at 103–06. See generally Thomas Geoghegan, The Law in Shambles (2005) 
(discussing the ways that politics has undercut the Rule of Law in American courts). 
21 See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1026, 1029 
(2003) (contending that not all laws and rules are equally susceptible to collapse). 
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fact were unknown, obscured by people’s beliefs, rejected because of 
outright skepticism that objective facts exist, or became false (say, be-
cause technological advances permitted cars to pass through each 
other harmlessly), a right-hand side lane restriction would not just be 
seen as arbitrary, but as unpredictable.22 
 Why we are discussing the need for predictable liability may still 
seem vague right now. This paper gradually fills in details. What can 
be said here is that common law (e.g. tort) and even constitutional 
jurisprudence have fostered the creep of unsavory politics by creating 
many unpredictable laws—rules formulated in disregard of objective 
facts.23 An example of this is First Amendment false speech law, but as 
we shall show, the principle is more general. Where possible, laws 
should instead conform to facts to resist the forces of political expedi-
ency and moral relativism.24 
II. The Need for Predictable Constitutionalized  
Speech Liability 
 The reason we have begun this Article with a discussion of general 
liability principles is because speech liability (i.e. First Amendment 
law) is closely related to regular liability. We can gain great insight 
into general liability principles by understanding free speech law prin-
ciples.25 
 Before our discussion of speech liability can begin, we must pause 
to note that we will be treading in a territory that is uncomfortable to 
many First Amendment scholars. In this author’s experience, most 
Americans are “absolutist” free speech advocates who become fumy at 
any discussion of speech liability. There are two types of absolutists: 
orthodox and semi-strong. Orthodox absolutists question whether any 
                                                                                                                      
22 Cf. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946) (overturning ancient aerial 
property laws abruptly because of the invention of airplanes). 
23 Some liability creep may be attributable to an inevitable human tendency to rely on 
intuition about what attributes are relevant in determining the blameworthiness of a be-
havior. See Paul H. Robinson, Some Doubts About Argument by Hypothetical, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 
813, 823–25 (2000). The problem is that intuition often rests upon factually incorrect in-
ferences. See id. at 820–21. 
24 Equally important, philosophical skeptics cannot be permitted to wreck social stabil-
ity by claiming, in practical legal settings, the right to dispute that humans have access to 
objective knowledge. See Keith DeRose, Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions, 52 Phil. & 
Phenomenological Res. 913, 924–28 (1992) (arguing that contextually invariant skepti-
cism is an inappropriate rhetorical tactic). 
25 In Part VII, we will be able to generalize some of our conclusions about predictable 
speech liability to all forms of liability. See infra notes 128–152 and accompanying text. 
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legal liability for speech is permissible under the First Amendment.26 
But the Supreme Court has repeatedly and clearly stressed that some 
speech liability is constitutionally valid.27 The camp of semi-strong ab-
solutists is different from orthodox absolutists in that it acknowledges 
that legal liability is appropriate for some speech.28 But it also asserts 
that all speech liability requires stronger or different justification than 
liability for all other forms of behavior because of the First Amendment.29 
 In one sense, semi-strong absolutists are correct that speech liabil-
ity should be different than other liability. Thankfully, our Constitution 
does explicitly assure us a freedom of speech, apart from the regulation 
of other forms of behavior. Marbury v. Madison allowed the Supreme 
Court to discover (i.e. establish) First Amendment law through the 
power of judicial review.30 The Court, in other words, is the final au-
thority in setting speech regulations. Yet in another sense, what semi-
strong absolutists fail to see is that just because the Court has exclusive 
power to constitutionalize rules governing free speech, this does not 
mean that the rationale by which the Court limits speech liability 
should differ from its rationales for limiting other forms of liability if the 
                                                                                                                      
26 See, e.g., Howard Rheingold, Why Censoring Cyberspace Is Futile, 6 Computer Under-
ground Dig., at file 2 (1994), http://cu-digest.org/CUDS6/cud6.40 (arguing that abso-
lutely no government regulation of cyberspace speech is acceptable). 
27 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (“The need to avoid 
self-censorship by the news media is, however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, 
this Court would have embraced long ago the view that publishers and broadcasters enjoy 
an unconditional and indefeasible immunity from liability . . . .”); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (holding that certain categories of speech con-
tent had always been denied First Amendment protection). 
28 From experience, most self-proclaimed “absolutists” are not orthodox absolutists, 
but rather semi-strong. What “absolutists” usually mean by their label is that their valuation 
of unfettered free speech is so large that no additional government restrictions on speech 
should be permitted beyond those currently in existence. The way to tell whether you are 
speaking to an orthodox absolutist or rather a semi-strong absolutist is to ask, “Do you 
reject any restrictions on speech, including any that the Supreme Court has constitutional-
ized? For example, was the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan wrong to allow 
any form of libel action for public officials? Or are fraud and perjury charges unconstitu-
tional?” If the person says “yes,” you are speaking to an orthodox absolutist. If the person 
says “no,” it means the person’s valuation of speech is not infinite, just very large! 
29 See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 8 (1982) (“[I]f 
the state needs no stronger justification for dealing with speech than it needs for dealing 
with other forms of conduct, then the principle of freedom of speech is only an illusion.”). 
30 See generally 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the Court’s power of judicial 
review). Years later, the Court stated: “It matters not that [a speech restriction] has been 
applied in a civil action and that it is common law only . . . . The test is not the form in 
which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in 
fact been exercised.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). 
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Court were to render liability predictable.31 The point of predictable liability 
is that anyone (not just Supreme Court justices) should be able to accu-
rately discover the pertinent rules for a given speech. Although the Su-
preme Court has final authority to check lower courts’ speech deci-
sions, it does not bestow the Court with the ability to create 
unpredictable rules where predictable rules are possible. 
 Absolutists should, therefore, at least recognize the concept that 
we advance throughout the remainder of this Article: speech law and 
other forms of law are actually quite similar conceptually, and rules 
for governing conduct and speech should therefore be more uniform 
than they are currently. Indeed, speech can cause the same legally 
cognizable injuries as can other forms of behavior: fear, emotional 
distress, physical injury or loss of life (e.g. by incitement, fighting 
words, or misleading product marketing), aiding/abetting criminal 
conduct, property damage (including cyber-property), invasion of 
privacy, commercial injury, disclosure of sensitive government secrets, 
intellectual property dilution or loss, forgery, damage to reputation 
(through defamation), financial loss (through fraud or unfair compe-
tition or accounting error), or misled juries (through perjury). From 
these examples, it is readily apparent that speech, just like conduct, 
can be the cause of a civilly or criminally punishable injury. For this 
Article’s purposes, let us call such an injury a “speech tort.”32 
 Commentators and scholars frequently debate whether courts 
strike the right First Amendment balance in speech torts. It is easy to 
talk about or criticize such balancing in the abstract. The hard task for 
courts is to assess whether and what imposition of liability in a particu-
lar speech tort is appropriate.33 A silly example confirms why predict-
                                                                                                                      
31 Also, do not misunderstand our discussion as suggesting either that: (1) constitu-
tionalization of speech liability established by the common law is inappropriate; or (2) 
bygone common-law defamation rules were better proxies of predictable rules than consti-
tutionalized standards have been. In response to the first matter, constitutionalization of 
all common-law speech liability must and will happen; the First Amendment compels it. See 
U.S. Const. amend I. Regarding the second matter, few states have common-law tort rules 
that even partly conform to predictable liability principles. See infra notes 45–56 (citing a 
variety of contexts in which unpredictable liability rules arise). 
32 See Ronald B. Standler, Infotorts 2 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, http://www.rbs2. 
com/infotort.pdf (discussing a new class of torts, in which communicated information harms 
someone). The injury complained of in a speech tort could also be the basis of a judicially 
recognized non-speech tort or criminal action. It all depends on what caused that injury: 
speech or omission of speech, or conduct or omission of conduct. 
33 Others have made similar observations about the need to create workable standards 
for specific applications of general constitutional decrees. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Mat-
ter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 148 (1997). Justice Scalia states: 
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able rules are necessary for effective First Amendment balancing. 
Suppose the following rule were discovered by the Supreme Court to 
be based on the Constitution: 
Octogenarians with purple mohawks are automatically liable for al-
leged speech tort injuries. All other speakers are absolved of liability. 
 This rule is unpredictable. It determines First Amendment speech 
protections by determining three particular facts about a speaker: age, 
hair color, and hairstyle. There would not be a lot of speech liability if 
all speech torts turned on this rule. The resulting rarity of speech liabil-
ity might tempt us, particularly if we are of an absolutist bent, to think 
we are upholding our free speech values and that we have struck the 
correct First Amendment balance. We are not and we have not, 
though.34 There just are not many octogenarian punk rockers to sue. 
(And those who do exist will be forced silent by the threat of liability 
under an unjust First Amendment rule.) 
 So, even if the Supreme Court has the constitutional authority to 
do otherwise, it must avoid constitutionalization of unpredictable 
rules.35 Yet as the next section will show, this has not occurred. 
                                                                                                                      
I certainly do not assert that [the Equal Protection Clause] permits discrimi-
nation on the basis of age, property, sex, “sexual orientation,” or for that mat-
ter even blue eyes and nose rings. Denial of equal protection on all of these 
grounds is prohibited—but that still leaves open the question of what consti-
tutes a denial of equal protection. Is it a denial of equal protection on the ba-
sis of sex to have segregated toilets in public buildings, or to exclude women 
from combat? 
Id. 
34 Categorically silencing eighty-year-olds with spiked purple hair will do little (if any-
thing) to deter significant speech tort injuries. Simultaneously, nearly all of the value of 
these octogenarians’ free speech is lost if they perceive the threat of liability as credible. 
35 Once judicially adopted, unpredictable rules have constitutional precedent. See, e.g., 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. That is problematic because constitutionalization makes it 
considerably harder to back up and replace unpredictable rules with predictable rules 
(which themselves must continuously evolve, as we will see, to accommodate the evolution 
of knowledge). Eventually cases will arise in which predictable and unpredictable liability 
lead to different liability conclusions. At that point, the Court will either ignore the “hard” 
outlier instances of regulated speech (which only delays the inevitable day when it must 
hear them), try to patch up the “hard” cases with additional unpredictable rules, or admit 
that its constitutionalized unpredictable rules were not so desirable after all. 
678 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:669 
III. Defamation & Actual Malice: An Unpredictable 
Constitutionalized Core Rule 
 Among speech torts, defamation has experienced the most ex-
tensive constitutionalization by far. Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
1964 decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, each state had its own 
common-law defamation laws.36 Sullivan kicked off the constitution-
alization of defamation.37 A spate of subsequent constitutional defa-
mation decisions (each applying or modifying the “core” Sullivan 
rules for other litigated speeches) has largely displaced common-law 
defamation rules.38 
 Many commentators say that they like the balance struck in the 
Supreme Court’s defamation cases. One is forced to respond by say-
ing something that initially sounds completely heretical: established 
defamation precedent is wrong.39 Before you elect to smite this author 
with a legal locust swarm or cast him into juristic purgatory, please 
take note what we are not claiming. We are not saying that the Court 
thus far has reached the wrong outcomes in its constitutionalized 
                                                                                                                      
36 See 376 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1964). 
37 See id. at 269. The Court stated that: 
[W]e are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight 
to the epithet “libel” than we have to other “mere labels” of state law. Like . . . 
various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been chal-
lenged in this court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitu-
tional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First 
Amendment. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
38 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (utilizing the actual 
malice standard set forth in Sullivan for a libel action with presumed or punitive damages); 
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971) (utilizing the actual malice standard 
for a libel action involving a public official’s private conduct). Justice White in his dissent 
in Gertz pointed out that “using . . . [the First] Amendment as the chosen instrument, the 
[Sullivan] Court, in a few printed pages, has federalized major aspects of libel law by de-
claring unconstitutional in important respects the prevailing defamation law in all or most 
of the 50 States.” 418 U.S. at 370 (White, J., dissenting). 
 Once or twice the Court has asserted that defamations under certain factual circum-
stances did not require constitutionalization. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (holding that the actual malice standard did not 
apply in a defamation case not involving matters of public concern). In actuality, the Court 
did constitutionalize defamation; under similar fact patterns to these rare cases, “constitu-
tionalization” means leaving defendants at the mercy of state common law. Presumably, if 
state common law were modified to impose excessive liability in similar factual circum-
stances, the Court could revisit its decision to “leave” regulation of that speech to states. 
39 Christopher P. Guzelian, Scientific Speech, 93 Iowa L. Rev 881, 910–17 (2008) [here-
inafter Guzelian, Scientific Speech]. 
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defamation jurisprudence.40 We are making no claim whatsoever 
about the propriety of those outcomes. The objection is that in get-
ting those results, the Court constitutionalized unpredictable rules. 
 One example of an unpredictable core defamation rule is the 
“actual malice” standard from Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.41 
As a practical matter, this standard offers the media nearly insur-
mountable protection from suits by public figures and punitive dam-
age claims by private figures. Granted, we American absolutists do not 
want a lot of defamation suits to prevail as a consequence of our re-
gard for freedom of speech. Yet just like an unpredictable rule that 
turns on a speaker’s age or hair color, a speaker’s intent is uncorre-
lated with the risk of his speech’s resulting in injury.42 Justice Byron 
White perceived this point well: “Why a defamatory statement is more 
apt to cause injury if the lie is intentional than when it is only negli-
gent, I fail to understand. I suggest that judges and juries who must 
live by these rules will find them equally incomprehensible.”43 
 What is worse is that precisely because the First Amendment re-
quires the Court to constitutionalize other speech torts, the tempta-
tion will be to adopt these same unpredictable defamation standards 
for other causes of action.44 Indeed, some lower courts are doing ex-
                                                                                                                      
40 See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (refusing to ap-
ply common-law defamation rules and instead requiring that the private figure plaintiff 
bear the burden of showing falsity and fault before recovering damages); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 
348–50; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283–84. 
41 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
42 See infra notes 59–79 and accompanying text. 
43 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 395 (White, J., dissenting). One might respond that the actual mal-
ice rule exists only to preserve the benefits of free speech, and has nothing to do with the 
speech’s risks. But if speech rules truly were concerned only with preserving the benefits 
of speech, the appropriate rule would still not be the actual malice standard. It would in-
stead be: “No speech liability, ever” —the orthodox absolutist standard that the Supreme 
Court has long rejected. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
Contrast the actual malice rule with the public/private figure defamation rule, which 
logically seems much more like a rule designed to optimally balance deterrence of speech 
harms and preservation of speech benefits. In other words, the rule seems to be a predict-
able rule. (Whether the public/private figure defamation rule is a predictable rule is an 
empirical question.) The Court has observed that public figures have a greater capacity to 
defend themselves against libel (the risk of character injury is allegedly lower for attacks on 
public figures because of their ability to publicly offset the allegations), and speaking out 
against public figures is believed to be worthy of greater First Amendment protection than 
speech relating to private figures (the benefit of speech against public figures, even if libel-
ous, is higher). See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (“[P]rivate individuals are not only more vulner-
able to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of re-
covery.”). 
44 See infra notes 45–56 and accompanying text. 
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actly this by applying the actual malice rule to other types of First 
Amendment claims, such as intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress and commercial speech suits.45 Courts are entertaining numer-
ous other speech torts and crimes besides defamation, and the specter 
of unpredictable rules can arise in various contexts: commercial inju-
ries,46 unfair competition or trademark law,47 fraud,48 trade libel,49 
perjury,50 group libel,51 obscenity or child pornography,52 incite-
ment,53 intimidation,54 invasions of privacy,55 and negligent or inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress or fear.56 
                                                                                                                      
45 See Guzelian, Scientific Speech, supra note 39, at 913–17. See generally Alfred C. Yen, A 
First Amendment Perspective on the Construction of Third-Party Copyright Liability, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 
1481 (2009) (applying First Amendment liability theories to third-party copyright liability). 
46 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771–72 (1976) (“Obviously, much commercial speech is . . . deceptive or misleading. We 
foresee no obstacle to a State’s dealing effectively with this problem. The First Amend-
ment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State from ensuring that the stream of 
commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.”) (footnote omitted). 
47 See McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding 
Lanham Act claim of mouthwash’s equal effectiveness in removing plaque to be mislead-
ing advertising because clinical studies were not “sufficiently reliable to permit one to con-
clude with reasonable certainty that Listerine is as effective as floss in fighting plaque and 
gingivitis”). 
48 See Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 501 n.7 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(construing Texas law to require the following elements for a fraud action: “(1) that a 
material representation was made; (2) that it was false; (3) that the speaker knew it was 
false when made or that the speaker made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth 
and as a positive assertion; (4) that he made it with the intention that it be acted upon by 
the other party; (5) that the party acted in reliance upon it; and (6) damage”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
49 See Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes,” 800 F. Supp. 928, 931, 933–35 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (al-
lowing disparagement claims against CBS by apple farmers, even though none of the 
statements in the broadcast was “of and concerning” any of the specific 4700 members of 
the state’s red apple farming industry). 
50 See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993) (“[A] defendant’s right to tes-
tify does not include a right to commit perjury.”). 
51 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258, 263 (1952) (finding contentions that 
implicate an entire race’s behavioral attributes “libelous”). 
52 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973) (defining obscenity as “(a) whether 
‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, 
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, 
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value”) (citation omitted). 
53 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (striking down a state 
statute as too broad because incitement occurs only when “advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”). 
54 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362–63 (2003) (upholding a statute permitting 
felony convictions of individuals who burned crosses with intent to intimidate). 
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 Given how remarkably precedent-based law tends to be, it is quite 
important that the constitutionalization of these torts be predictable 
wherever possible so that precedent has a sound basis. Our subsequent 
aim in this Article will be to think critically about how to constitutional-
ize laws that are predictable for a major subcategory of speech torts, so-
called “false speech torts,” of which defamation is but one member. 
IV. Three Problems with Current Legal Understandings  
of “False” Speech 
 Defamation is a fascinating speech tort. Besides being the most 
constitutionalized, it belongs to a class of speech torts called the false 
speech torts (e.g. defamation, fraud, false advertising, false light, or 
some fear or emotional distress lawsuits). Because the question of a 
speech’s falsity or truthfulness arises commonly in speech torts, it is a 
core question in First Amendment cases.57 
                                                                                                                      
55 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 385 n.9 (1967) (“Many ‘right of privacy’ cases 
could in fact have been brought as ‘libel per quod’ actions, and several have been brought 
on both grounds.”). 
56 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53, 57 (1988) (recognizing value of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in general, but rejecting specific claim 
where jury had found that the speaker made no assertion of fact); Cowras v. Hard Copy, 56 F. 
Supp. 2d 207, 211 (D. Conn. 1999) (holding media defendants liable under a negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress claim because they “made no attempt to ascertain the truth for 
fear of killing what they believed was a ‘great story’”). But cf. Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Cause of Action Against the Media, 5 Comm. L. & 
Pol’y 469, 488–91 (2000) (noting that many courts award intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (“IIED”) damages for specific newsgathering activities, but that few have thus far 
recognized content-based IIED harms by the media). See generally Christopher P. Guzelian, 
Liability & Fear, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 713 (2004) [hereinafter Guzelian, Liability & Fear] (arguing 
that misleading risk communication can cause legally cognizable fear or emotional distress 
harms). 
57 Curiously, not all courts appear to agree yet with the principle that the truth or fal-
sity of a speech can be a relevant consideration in determining whether to hold a speech 
liable for injuries that it causes. For instance, in 1985 in American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (years after the Supreme Court held in 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. that “there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact”) 
held that: 
Under the First Amendment the government must leave to the people the 
evaluation of ideas. Bald or subtle, an idea is as powerful as the audience al-
lows it to be. A belief may be pernicious—the beliefs of Nazis led to the death 
of millions, those of the Klan to the repression of millions. A pernicious belief 
may prevail . . . [because] the Constitution does not make the dominance of truth a 
necessary condition of freedom of speech. . . . Under the First Amendment, . . . 
there is no such thing as a false idea, so the government may not restrict 
speech on the ground that in a free exchange truth is not yet dominant. 
 
682 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:669 
 Precisely because liability in false speech torts requires speech to 
be “false,” it is important that we understand what about “false speech” 
is false. Curiously, there seems to be no clear legal agreement. The 
term is understood at some gross level of abstraction. For example: we 
publish something “false” about an actress having extramarital affairs, 
and subscribers read it and believe us. The actress ultimately suffers a 
material injury to reputation: “defamation.” By contrast, displaying 
child pornography can result in speech liability, but it is not a false 
speech tort.58 Thus, it is quite easy to determine whether a speech tort 
turns on a truth or falsity rule. But it is a far more difficult matter to 
                                                                                                                      
Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327–28, 330, 331 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
Such jurisprudential rhetoric—a violently negative reaction to the concept that the 
First Amendment can function to restrict false speech—is astonishingly broad. It seems to 
imply that the First Amendment is a suicide pact for truth. Modern legal scholars, however, 
criticize thinking such as the Seventh Circuit’s as outdated attempts to adhere to the 
flawed “marketplace model” of speech, in which the government’s dominant strategy is 
not to intervene to ensure that truth prevails. For example, Professor Jeff Stake notes that 
not all transmissible ideas (often called “memes”) are equally well perceived, and that 
regulation may be necessary to ensure that good speech (i.e. true speech) prevails: 
It becomes harder to defend the position that we should let any and all ideas 
exist once we know that it is impossible for all ideas to coexist in one envi-
ronment and that some ideas will work to kill off others. By stopping the rep-
lication of some ideas, we may be able to preserve many more from extinc-
tion. Herbert Spencer proclaimed that survival of the fittest was not just 
nature’s way, it ought to be our way. That fallacy, of drawing “ought” from “is,” 
is just as morally wrong for memes as it is for genes. . . . 
 . . . 
 . . . Jefferson, Holmes, and Brandeis believed that bad speech can be 
countered with good speech. . . . When they wrote, evolutionary theory had 
not yet been applied to ideas. It is time to replace the marketplace metaphor 
with a better one, the primeval soup. In this primeval soup, some ideas sur-
vive and some do not. And we are part of the soup, the environment, and 
have some power to influence the results. But we are not in complete control 
of our memes. And the ideas that eventually survive in this primeval soup will 
not necessarily be our friends. 
Jeffrey Evans Stake, Are We Buyers or Hosts? A Memetic Approach to the First Amendment, 52 Ala. L. 
Rev. 1213, 1243, 1266–67 (2001); see also Oliver R. Goodenough, Cultural Replication Theory 
and Law: Proximate Mechanisms Make a Difference, 30 Vt. L. Rev. 989, 992–93, 1002–04 (2006) 
(explaining how cultural transmissions occur through the replication of actions divorced 
from ideas which can have implications for the kind of information the law transmits); Deana 
Pollard Sacks, Speech Torts (forthcoming 2010) (arguing that where speech can be objectively 
verified as factually false, it is entitled to less exacting First Amendment scrutiny). 
58 Child pornography is not “false”; the reason it is civilly or criminally sanctioned is 
because it employs underage actors in sexual acts. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
756–64 (1982) (listing reasons why states have more latitude to regulate child pornogra-
phy). But cf. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250–51, 258 (2002) (protecting 
computer-generated, “virtual” child pornography). 
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know what standard to apply to determine truth or falsity. As we shall 
see below, “falsity” as currently administered by courts is an unpredict-
able rule. This is quite disturbing, insofar as the protection of much 
speech under the First Amendment turns in large part on its “truth” or 
“falsity.” 
 Upon closer examination, we shall discover that there are three 
problems with current legal definitions of “falsity” that make it an un-
predictable rule. Each of the next three subsections highlights one of 
these problems. 
A. Bullshit 
 Suppose Joe says, “John shot his wife,” and we know John has 
never handled a weapon. Most say the statement is false. Simple, 
right? Look at the literal words and determine their truth. But say 
John is a photographer who took his wife’s picture while Joe watched. 
Is Joe’s statement still false? The statement itself did not change. It is 
the same literal words. But we now have additional details that make 
the speech true. If we lacked that background knowledge at the time 
we heard the speech, but were later informed of it, we might well say 
Joe’s statement was “misleading.” 
 So what does it mean when we say that speech is “misleading”? It 
means that the perception the audience takes away—or to say it differ-
ently, the speech’s implication—was false. Too often, casual judicial 
reference to “false speech” or “false and misleading speech” or “false 
or misleading speech” confuses literal falsity and false perceptions. 
The two forms of falsity are not the same. Although frequently not 
followed, the Supreme Court has established that perceptions are 
what ultimately matter for First Amendment purposes.59 
 In law, “false speech” or “misleading speech” means only that a 
speech causes false perception. We cannot say how many fine judges and 
First Amendment scholars repeatedly make the serious mistake of exam-
                                                                                                                      
59 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (noting that the test 
of falsity is whether a speech “‘would have a different effect on the mind of the reader 
from that which the pleaded truth would have produced’” (quoting Robert D. Sack, Li-
bel, Slander, and Related Problems 138 (2d prtg. 1980))); see also 1 Robert D. Sack, 
Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander, and Related Problems § 2.4.2.1, at 2-18, § 2.4.5, 
at 2-32 to -33 (3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter Sack, Sack on Defamation] (“Particular words 
must be read in the context of the communication as a whole . . . . A publisher is, in gen-
eral, liable for the implications of what he or she has said or written, not merely the spe-
cific, literal statements made.”). 
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ining only literal aspects of speech to determine “falsity.”60 The best way 
of seeing that only false perceptions matter under the First Amendment 
is with a grid, with literal communication juxtaposed against perception, 
to form four distinct potential rules regarding falsity: 
 
Figure 1: What “False” Speech Is: Perception, Not 
Literal Communication 
 Each of the four boxes represents a pair of speech attributes that 
individually or jointly could form a potential rule. Most legal authori-
ties distinguish the “truth” or “falsity” of a speech by its literal words. 
Nevertheless, as we will now see, settled constitutional law indicates 
that only perception, not literal communication, is a speech attribute 
from which a rule should be inferred.61 
 Box 1: Literally true words, True perception. Where both literal 
speech and the perceived implication of a communication in context 
are true, there is no liability under the First Amendment.62 
 Box 2: Literally false words, True perception. If a statement is literally 
false, but the communication is perceived as true in context, even pre-
                                                                                                                      
60 See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
61 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
62 Sack, Sack on Defamation, supra note 59, § 2.1.1, at 2-7 (noting that falsity “is usu-
ally considered . . . a prerequisite for recovery as a matter of constitutional law in virtually 
all cases”). 
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Sullivan common law indicates that there is no false speech tort liabil-
ity solely for literal falsities contained in the communication.63 
 Box 3: Literally false words, False perception. A statement that is liter-
ally false and perceived false is usually the least controversial case in 
proving the “falsity” element of a false speech tort. (Do not assume, 
however, that just because falsity has been proved, liability is forth-
coming. All other requirements of the tort must likewise be met.) 
 Box 4: Literally true words, False perception. Can literally true words 
result in defamation liability? The answer is yes.64 Literally true words 
contained within the context of a communication, which involves 
many elements beyond those words but still within the speaker’s con-
trol or awareness (e.g. tone, juxtaposition of statements, emphasis, 
innuendo, graphic images, symbolism, the omission of key facts,65 
body language,66 etc.), can cause false perceptions. 
 Indeed, many scholars remark that communication in this mul-
timedia era has become largely visual and auditory.67 This shift in 
                                                                                                                      
63 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272–73 (1964) (citing cases). Literal fal-
sities in a speech sometimes are the main source of a false perception, but their presence 
alone does not guarantee false perceptions. See, e.g., Masson, 501 U.S. at 516 (“The com-
mon law of libel takes but one approach to the question of falsity . . . . It overlooks minor 
inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth.”); Currier v. W. Newspapers, Inc., 
855 P.2d 1351, 1354 (Ariz. 1993) (“A technically false statement may nonetheless be con-
sidered substantially true if, viewed ‘through the eyes of the average reader,’ it differs from 
the truth ‘only in insignificant details.’” (quoting Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 
F.2d 1066, 1073 (5th Cir. 1987))); Sack, Sack on Defamation, supra note 59, § 4.4.2, at 4-
65 (“In determining whether facts upon which a comment is based are accurate, the rules 
of construction applicable to the proof of truth come into play. Minor errors of fact . . . do 
not constitute falsity, so long as the ‘gist’ or ‘sting’ of the factual allegations is accurate.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
64 See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
65 See Midwest Commerce Banking Co. v. Elkhart City Ctr., 4 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 
1993) (citing cases and noting that “[o]missions are actionable as implied representations 
when the circumstances are such that a failure to communicate a fact induces a belief in its 
opposite”). 
66 See Allan & Barbara Pease, The Definitive Book of Body Language 10 (2006) 
(estimating that between sixty and eighty percent of communication is transmitted 
through body language, not vocal communication). 
67 See David L. Altheide, The News Media, the Problem Frame, and the Production of Fear, 38 
Soc. Q. 647, 664 (1997). Altheide states that: 
[C. Wright] Mills . . . urged sociologists to distinguish between personal troubles 
and social issues. The great Mills was not wrong. He just lived in a period domi-
nated more by print than electronics. Everyday life is increasingly mediated by 
information technology as we experience events in an ecology of communica-
tion. Information technology and its varied communication formats (“media 
logic”) are part of our “effective environment” which we become accustomed to 
and take for granted. And just as humans in new environments (e.g., high-
 
686 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:669 
communicative format is not accidental; these formats are far more 
emotive and therefore far more capable of influencing audience per-
ception.68 The overall social impact of literal text, even in staid for-
mats such as newspapers (which, interestingly, are now supplemented 
with graphics, photographs, charts, etc.), is waning.69 
 It is no coincidence that a Princeton University philosopher, 
Harry Frankfurt, has published recently a bestselling academic essay 
that notes a disturbing modern surge in the intensity and amount of 
misleading advocacy (he calls misleading advocates “bullshitters”).70 
                                                                                                                      
altitude mountain climbing) “learn” to breathe differently and soon do it rou-
tinely, postmodern media users “learn” to adjust to new information technology 
and communication formats, soon taking them for granted. 
 Media materials contribute to public perceptions . . . whether as “prim-
ing,” agenda setting, or shaping public discourse through news formats. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Ann Bostrom & Ragnar E. Löfstedt, Communicating Risk: 
Wireless and Hardwired, 23 Risk Analysis 241, 245 (2003) (“[W]ords are becoming bit play-
ers on the risk communication stage, where graphical depiction of risk is increasingly 
common.”). As Northwestern University scholar Les Friedman has said, “there are no neu-
tral images in film.” Lester D. Friedman, High Anxiety: Medicine, Morals and the Media, 
Lecture at Stanford University School of Medicine (Oct. 1, 2003) (notes from lecture on 
file with author); see also Celio Ferreira et al., From Vision to Catastrophe: A Risk Event in 
Search of Images, in Risk, Media, and Stigma: Understanding Public Challenges to 
Modern Science and Technology 283, 298–99 ( James Flynn et al. eds., 2001) (conclud-
ing that visual images by their nature are better suited to converting neutral objects to 
stereotypes than text or radio); George Gerbner, Reclaiming Our Cultural Mythology: Televi-
sion’s Global Marketing Strategy Creates a Damaging and Alienated Window on the World, In Con-
text, Spring 1994, at 40, http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC38/Gerbner.htm (“[T]elevi- 
sion is a mythology—highly organically connected, repeated every day so that the themes 
. . . run through all programming and news [and] have the effect of cultivating concep-
tions of reality.”); cf. Armstrong v. H & C Commc’ns, Inc., 575 So. 2d 280, 280, 281, 283 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of a tort of outrage claim 
brought by parents of abducted and murdered daughter against television station that 
broadcast images of girl’s skull on her memorial service day). 
68 Psychologists and neuroscientists report that emotional communication can have 
dramatic, often unconscious, influences on perception. See Guzelian, Scientific Speech, supra 
note 39, at 901 n.68. 
69 See Guzelian, Liability & Fear, supra note 56, at 759–62; see also Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes states: 
Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted 
on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the 
movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an 
opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker’s enthusiasm 
for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. 
Id. 
70 Harry G. Frankfurt, On Bullshit 62–67 (2005). The American Dialect Society 
voted “truthiness” (“the quality of stating concepts one wishes or believes to be true, rather 
than concepts or facts known to be true”) as the 2005 Word of the Year. Press Release, Am. 
 
2010] True and False Speech 687 
Bullshitters speak with an exclusive focus on achieving their goals, 
whatever those goals may be: getting votes, selling a product, or re-
porting racy news.71 
 In a world of totally protected speech, bullshitters would use what-
ever form(s) of speech they believe best suited to achieve their particu-
lar goal. But differing levels of First Amendment protection based on 
speech’s truth or falsity force bullshitters to engage in a more compli-
cated cost-benefit analysis. Because First Amendment law offers less 
protection for Box III speech, most bullshitters avoid (or quickly learn 
to avoid) it. And where bullshitters believe they are most likely to 
achieve their goals through First Amendment-protected Box I or II 
speech, they will. Thus, not all bullshit is false. Some of it happens, for-
tuitously or intentionally, to result in true audience perceptions. 
 Bullshitters, however, sometimes believe that their goals are best 
achieved by Box IV speech.72 They speak literal truths, but by present-
ing them in a certain style (perhaps with visual and auditory cues that 
overwhelm those literal truths and create a different perception) or 
by omitting relevant facts, or through other elements of communica-
tion under their control, they either intentionally or inadvertently 
cause injuriously false perception in seeking to meet their goals. Lit-
erally accurate bullshitters accused of spewing falsehoods typically 
protest that they have said nothing false, and may feel justified be-
cause of their literal honesty, but this defense is not an adequate First 
Amendment defense. First Amendment falsity does not turn on a 
speaker’s intent; it is gauged by perception.73 
 Accordingly, the First Amendment does not offer greater protec-
tion for literally-true-but-falsely-perceived speech (Box IV speech) 
than it does for literally-false-and-falsely-perceived speech (Box III 
speech). Consider, for example, a constitutionally validated defama-
tion cause of action called “defamation by implication.” Justice Byron 
                                                                                                                      
Dialect Soc’y, Truthiness Voted 2005 Word of the Year By American Dialect Society ( Jan. 6, 
2006), http://www.americandialect.org/Words_of_the_Year_2005.pdf. This word appears 
to be synonymous with Frankfurt’s philosophical conception of bullshit. See Frankfurt, 
supra, at 33–34, 47–48. 
71 See Frankfurt, supra note 70, at 56. 
72 Alternatively, bullshitters may sometimes estimate that Box III speech would be the 
most likely to achieve their goals, but one must also recognize that this speech carries the 
greatest risk of liability. Because courts often seem to (incorrectly) apply appreciably dis-
parate standards of First Amendment protection for Box III and IV speech, and because 
Box IV speech is as effective as Box III speech when a false perception is required to 
achieve particular goals, would-be Box III bullshitters can be predicted to become Box IV 
bullshitters. 
73 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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White, sitting by designation on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, explained this concept well: 
“[D]efamation by implication” occurs when a defendant 
“‘(1) juxtaposes a [literal] series of facts so as to imply a de-
famatory connection between them, or (2) creates a de-
famatory implication by omitting facts, [such that] he may 
be held responsible for the defamatory implication, unless 
it qualifies as an [honest] opinion, even though the par-
ticular facts are correct.’” Thus, the touchstone of implied 
defamation claims is an artificial juxtaposition of two true 
statements or the material omission of facts that would 
render the challenged statement(s) non-defamatory. Under 
this definition, a defendant does not avoid liability by sim-
ply establishing the [literal] truth of the individual state-
ment(s); rather, the defendant must also defend the juxta-
position of two statements or the omission of certain facts.74 
 Numerous courts have recognized defamation-by-implication,75 
including the U.S. Supreme Court.76 In 1990, in Milkovich v. Lorain 
Journal Co., the Supreme Court acknowledged that literally-true-but-
misleading statements are not First Amendment-protected speech 
any more than are literally-false-and-misleading statements of fact: 
“[e]ven if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his 
                                                                                                                      
74 Toney v. WCCO Television, Midwest Cable & Satellite, 85 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 
1996) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (applying Minnesota law). 
75 See, e.g., Dodds v. ABC, Inc., 145 F.3d 1053, 1064 (9th Cir. 1998); Chapin v. Knight-
Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that implication must be a rea-
sonable one and author must intend to convey it); White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 
F.2d 512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1990); McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 249 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding, in the context of a Lanham Act false advertising claim, that “the 
district court must . . . evaluate whether the message is false or likely to mislead or confuse, 
and may consider factors such as the commercial context, the defendant’s prior advertis-
ing history, and the sophistication of the advertising audience. Of course, the court must 
also consider the text and images used in the advertisement . . . .”) (citation omitted); 
Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188, 191 (D.D.C. 1965); Strada v. Conn. Newspapers, Inc., 
477 A.2d 1005, 1012 (Conn. 1984) (noting that defamatory implication must arise from a 
material omission); Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211, 1217 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1978); Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 420 (Tenn. 1978); Turner 
v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. 2000); Mohr v. Grant, 68 P.3d 1159, 
1163 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 108 P.3d 768 (Wash. 2005). 
76 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990) (turning on the falsity of 
an implication that the plaintiff committed perjury). The Court found that “the connota-
tion [implicated by an opinion] that petitioner committed perjury is sufficiently factual to 
be susceptible of being proved true or false.” Id. 
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[statement], if those [literal] facts are . . . incomplete, or if his as-
sessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false 
assertion of fact.”77 
 The conceptual thrust of defamation-by-implication is not re-
stricted to defamation. Our point in this section has been to show that 
for “false” speech, “falsity” is determined by audience perception, not 
by the correctness of literal words.78 This point has become obscured 
because courts often (incorrectly) judge the falsity of literal state-
ments as a proxy for a judgment about false perceptions.79 
B. Semiotics (Speech Causation) 
 So far, we have learned that falsity is determined by perception, not 
by literal speech, but confusion about this point has led to unpredict-
able application of the “falsity” rule. A second contributor to falsity’s 
unpredictability is semiotics—the determination of whether speech caused 
the injurious perception. 
 Semiotics is the study of symbolic meaning, either in verbal lan-
guage or in other forms of communication. Semiotics has a rich and 
complex literature, spearheaded by some of the twentieth century’s 
famous philosophers and linguists like Ludwig Wittgenstein, George 
Orwell, Noam Chomsky, and Ferdinand de Saussure.80 A superficial 
discussion of semiotics is all that we need here. We can demonstrate 
it through Rene Magritte’s famous “This is not a pipe” painting (en-
titled The Treachery of Images): 
                                                                                                                      
77 Id. at 18–19. 
78 See, e.g., Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 849 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding, 
in a commercial disparagement claim, that “[a] statement is not ‘substantially true’ if it 
‘would have a different effect on the mind of the reader [or viewer] from that which the 
pleaded truth would have produced’” (quoting Masson, 501 U.S. at 517) (alteration in 
original)). 
79 See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
80 For examples of this literature, see Ferdinand De Saussure, Course in General 
Linguistics (Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye eds., Roy Harris trans., Open Court 12th 
prtg. 2002) (1972); Edward S. Herman & Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: 
The Political Economy of the Mass Media (1988); George Orwell, Nineteen Eigh-
ty-Four (Alfred A. Knopf 1992) (1949); Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Inves-
tigations (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Blackwell Publishers 3d ed. 2001) (1953). 
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Figure 2: A Semiotic Painting 
 Magritte’s point was to remind viewers that his representation—oil 
smeared on parchment—is not a pipe. It is a symbol. The semiotic 
meaning of Magritte’s painting is achieved by a visual combination of 
the picture with the text “this is not a pipe.” Magritte intends viewers 
who do perceive a pipe to be reminded that what they are seeing is not 
a pipe. In other words, Magritte’s intent is for his audience to perceive 
semiotics. 
 It is important to understand that a speaker’s intended implication 
for his speech may not be the audience’s perception. There are many 
perceptions derivable from Magritte’s painting, all depending on who 
is looking.81 To an astute French speaker who knows what a pipe looks 
like, the painting is about the complexity of semiotics. A less astute 
francophone may think that the painting is proof that the artist is 
weird. To a French speaker who does not know what a pipe is, the 
painting offers little meaning. A non-French speaker simply perceives a 
pipe and may search for additional meaning by inquiring what the 
French text means. To a blind person, there is no perception. And any 
single person may well perceive multiple meanings in a painting. 
 Semiotics presents an uncomfortable problem for First Amend-
ment law in general and for false speech torts in particular. If false-
speech liability is to be predictable, a prospective speaker must be able to 
                                                                                                                      
81 Cf. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632–33 (1943) (“A person 
gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man’s comfort and inspi-
ration is another’s jest and scorn.”). 
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anticipate whether his speech will cause an injuriously false perception.82 
Yet the formation of perception is not always even causal. Subtle or 
chance variation in the conditions surrounding communication can 
have theoretically dramatic impacts on societal perceptions and future 
conveyance of ideas.83 Some false perceptions are also certainly caused 
by audiences. A careless or distracted audience, an exhausted or stressed 
audience, a hostile audience, an audience that unsuccessfully attempts 
to perceive a technical communication beyond its capacity to compre-
hend—there are so many ways by which the process of formulating per-
ception from a communication could be infused with audience error. 
There are also strong social incentives on the part of both speakers and 
audiences for speech to be indirect, which can lead to miscommunica-
tion.84 
 Semiotics, however, does not mean that the formation of a percep-
tion is always chaotic and outside any voluntary control of a speaker. A 
speaker does (at least partly or sometimes) cause audience percep-
tions.85 If the formation of perception were always predominantly in-
fluenced by factors beyond a speaker’s conscious control, there would 
be no advertising industry. Propaganda would never work, except by 
chance. There would be no consistent neurobiological evidence that a 
wide majority of people perceive a better taste to Coke than Pepsi after 
seeing the logos, but not in blind taste tests.86 There would be no de-
bates, no attempts to persuade. 
 Mere general recognition of the principle that speakers can cause 
injury is not enough, however. In each speech tort, it must be known 
through empirical evidence that speech caused the litigated injury. 
                                                                                                                      
82 See Guzelian, Kindynamic Theory, supra note 16, at 998–1000 (describing competing 
von Kriesian (causal) and von Burian (holistic) conceptions of liability). 
83 See, e.g., Susan Blackmore, The Power of Memes, 283 Sci. Am. 64, 65–68 (2000) (dis-
cussing how factors such as traditions and religion shape human behavior); W. Garett 
Mitchener & Martin A. Nowak, Chaos and Language, 271 Proc. Royal Soc’y London B 
701, 701 (2004) (discussing how small changes and interaction with other languages lead 
to dramatic changes in languages); Martin A. Nowak & David C. Krakauer, The Evolution of 
Language, 96 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 8028, 8028–31 (1999) (explaining the evolution of 
language through evolutionary game theory). 
84 See Steven Pinker et al., The Logic of Indirect Speech, 105 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 833, 
834–38 (2008) (explaining a three-part theory of indirect speech involving plausible deni-
ability, relationship negotiation, and language as a digital medium). 
85 See Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a First 
Amendment Ethnography, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2261, 2335–89 (2004) (arguing for judicial 
use of interpretative ethnographic standards in identifying the most plausible contextual 
perception of symbols). 
86 See Samuel M. McClure et al., Neural Correlates of Behavioral Preference for Culturally 
Familiar Drinks, 44 Neuron 379, 380–85 (2004). 
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Judges, not surprisingly, have struggled to objectively adjudicate ques-
tions of speech causation. In a renowned 1987 case, Tavoulareas v. Piro, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was di-
vided as to whether the literal language of an article was libelous.87 The 
majority accused the dissent of a “tortured attempt to discern some 
dark, hidden meaning” in the speech.88 In another curious instance, in 
1996, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in McDermott v. Biddle upheld a 
jury verdict that found three allegedly defamatory articles to be true 
when published in the Philadelphia Inquirer, but false when republished 
in a tabloid.89 The court noted that the different publication venues 
could plausibly account for the jury’s simultaneous findings of truth and 
falsity.90 
 Indeed, because the evidentiary determination of how a percep-
tion has formed is difficult, courts often duck the semiotics question by 
concentrating only on whether a speech contains literal falsehoods. 
This reluctance to engage in empirical analysis of a speech’s impact 
may well explain why courts focus on literalism rather than percep-
tions. Thus, we are witnessing a trend away from the penalization of 
literally true bullshitters (Box IV speakers) at exactly the time when 
mass multimedia have enabled them to mislead dramatically: 
If unrestrained . . . the theory of libel by implication would al-
low a jury to draw whatever inferences it wished from [literal] 
statements of fact. It would thereby permit liability for the 
perceived tone of a publication, [or] for statements that are in 
substance opinion or [literally] true . . . . 
 In recent years, therefore, courts have increasingly imposed 
limitations on recovery for libel by implication.91 
 This is folly. All defamation suits are defamation by implication suits. All 
false speech is false by implication. Some false speech involves literal false-
hoods. Other false speech does not. But literal falsehoods are not the 
cause of injuries. False perceptions are. Bullshitters recognize this,92 but 
                                                                                                                      
87 See 817 F.2d 762, 766–67 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc); id. at 810–11 (MacKinnon, J., 
dissenting). 
88 Id. at 781 (majority opinion). 
89 674 A.2d 665, 665, 669 (Pa. 1996). 
90 Id. at 669. 
91 Sack, Sack on Defamation, supra note 59, § 2.4.5, at 2-34 (footnotes omitted). 
92 See, e.g., Third World Traveler, Media Control and Censorship, http://www.third 
worldtraveler.com/Media/MediaCensorship.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2010). In the words 
of an anonymous former Soviet correspondent: 
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the law is ignoring the logic of its own core rule about false speech.93 
Courts simply must engage in the empirical analysis necessary to de-
termine whether a speech has caused an alleged injury.94 
 Empirical linguistic research is in its infancy. Even as it advances, it is 
unlikely that it will ever be possible to know specific causal relationships— 
that is, that this particular speech caused this particular plaintiff to con-
tract an injuriously false perception.95 Outlier false perceptions are im-
                                                                                                                      
I have the greatest admiration for your propaganda. Propaganda in the West 
is carried out by experts who have had the best training in the world—in the 
field of advertising—and have mastered the techniques with exceptional pro-
ficiency . . . . Yours are subtle and persuasive; ours are crude and obvious . . . . 
I think that the fundamental difference between our worlds, with respect to 
propaganda, is quite simple. You tend to believe yours . . . and we tend to dis-
believe ours. 
Id. 
93 Countering this general trend, some courts have clearly recognized that perception is 
the key to determining the harmfulness of speech. At least two courts have been willing to 
focus on subtle matters of speech causation, such as harms caused by subliminal speech. 
Those courts held that subliminal speech that results in death is unprotected speech, as it 
attempts to control an audience by circumventing normal, conscious modes of persuasion. 
See Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1148, 1149 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (characterizing sub-
liminal messages as speech that “sneaks into the brain,” making it unprotected under the 
First Amendment), aff’d 958 F.2d 1084 (11th Cir. 1992); Vance v. Judas Priest, Nos. 86-5844, 
86-3939, 1990 WL 130920, at *1, *23 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 1990) (holding that subliminal 
messages advocating suicide contained within music are not protected under the First 
Amendment from lawsuits by decedents’ families). 
94 The same concerns about acquiring evidentiary knowledge of causation apply to all 
forms of conduct, not just speech. See infra notes 128–146 and accompanying text. 
95 This issue of general causal knowledge versus specific causal knowledge is hardly limited 
to matters of speech causation. Scientific inquiry is always reductionist (i.e. it constantly seeks 
to narrow the scope of prediction), but rarely perfectly so. Most scientific causal conclusions 
are general (i.e. stereotypical) and may be inapplicable to a particular individual or circum-
stance. Occasionally, individual or subgroup-specific scientific knowledge is available. (In 
medicine, for example, so-called “N of 1” trials or high-power, well-designed studies can elicit 
refined causal knowledge, where it is ethical to do so. See Gordon Guyatt et al., Determining 
Optimal Therapy—Randomized Trials in Individual Patients, 314 N. Eng. J. Med. 889, 889–92 
(1986).) Naturally, “general” scientific conclusions should always be as individually tailored 
as suitable evidence permits. See Richard Peto et al., Large-Scale Randomized Evidence: Large, 
Simple Trials and Overviews of Trials, 48 J. Clinical Epidemiology 23, 34–39 (1995) (discuss-
ing how large-scale randomized evidence can best be generated and interpreted). 
Law, on the other hand, emphasizes individual rights and duties and demands utopian 
reductionism that usually exceeds science’s current capabilities. A good attorney can nearly 
always speculate why a general scientific conclusion is unsuitable for a particular instance or 
plaintiff. It is usually difficult to know whether that speculation is correct. See id. at 35. This 
concern, however, has been reduced by new systematic reviews. For instance, in eighty-two 
percent of fifty-five located studies that matched experimental and control treatments for 
patients both inside and outside controlled clinical trial settings, outside patients fared simi-
larly to or better than in-trial patients. David L. Sackett, Editorial, Participants in Research: 
Neither Guinea Pigs Nor Sacrificial Lambs, but Pointers to Better Health Care, 330 Brit. Med. J. 
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possible for speakers to prevent even if they wished to. First Amendment 
focus, therefore, should be centered on preventing speech that can be 
reliably predicted to lead to injuriously false mainstream perceptions. In-
deed, courts are beginning to approach semiotics by employing a “com-
mon false perception” standard (sometimes set as low as twenty percent 
of an audience) in commercial injury or unfair competition suits to 
                                                                                                                      
1164, 1164 (2005); Gunn Elisabeth Vist et al., Outcomes of Patients Who Participate in Random-
ised Controlled Trials Compared to Similar Patients Receiving Similar Interventions Who Do Not Par-
ticipate, Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 1, 9 (2008), available at 
http://mrw.intersci- 
ence. wiley.com/cochrane/clsysrev/articles/MR000009/frame.html; Gunn Elisabeth Vist et 
al., Systematic Review to Determine Whether Participation in a Trial Influences Outcome, 330 Brit. 
Med. J. 1175, 1176 (2005). Consider these objective findings alongside the overwhelming 
evidence indicating the following: 
 (a) Expert opinions reflect numerous unintended biases. See Colin F. 
Camerer & Eric J. Johnson, The Process-Performance Paradox in Expert Judgment: 
How Can Experts Know So Much and Predict So Badly?, in Toward a General 
Theory of Expertise: Prospects and Limits 195, 196 (K. Anders Ericsson 
& Jacqui Smith eds., 1991); Thomas Gilovich, How We Know What Isn’t 
So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life 49–72 (1993); 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 4 (Da-
niel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as 
Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 Risk Anal-
ysis 311, 316–19 (2004). 
 (b) Expert error is independent of an expert’s confidence in his opinion. 
See Camerer & Johnson, supra, at 211–12; Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Ver-
sus Actuarial Judgment, 243 Science 1668, 1672 (1989). 
 (c) General causal knowledge or decision analyses are better predictors for 
individual outcomes than are expert opinions. See Dawes et al., supra, at 1673; 
see also Lee Goldman et al., A Computer Protocol to Predict Myocardial Infarction in 
Emergency Department Patients with Chest Pain, 318 N. Eng. J. Med. 797, 802 
(1988); D.L. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 Science 250, 252, 
257 (1973); Harold C. Sox, Jr., Editorial, Decision Analysis: A Basic Clinical 
Skill?, 316 N. Eng. J. Med. 271, 271 (1987). See generally Readings on the 
Principles and Applications of Decision Analysis (Ronald A. Howard & 
James E. Matheson eds., 1989) (collecting papers on both the theory and ap-
plication of decision analysis). 
One may preliminarily conclude that general scientific knowledge: (1) does typically de-
scribe an individual plaintiff’s circumstances accurately; and (2) is more likely to predict 
those circumstances correctly than individual or group opinions can. The foregoing dis-
cussion does not imply that experts (or groups of experts) cannot sometimes outdo gener-
ally applicable evidence-based conclusions in making predictions about individual plain-
tiffs. The point is that in the (rare) instances when experts do choose to deviate from 
generalized scientific recommendations, experts have been shown to be incapable of re-
liably predicting that their deviation will be beneficial. The unintuitive implication of these 
findings is that use of expert testimony to improve upon existing general, evidence-based 
causal conclusions is undesirable. 
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gauge speech’s misleadingness.96 Some courts also consider semiotics an 
antitrust matter, holding that false speech is conduct subject to antitrust 
liability under the Sherman Act in which audiences can be “monopo-
lized” much as product markets can be.97 Such standards—and the em-
pirical analysis of speech that accompanies them—offer at least a starting 
point for objectively predicting when speech causes injury. 
C. Provably False Speech 
 We have thus far looked at two aspects—literalism and semiotics— 
that hinder courts from arriving at predictable results in adjudicating 
issues of falsity. A third questionable practice that obscures the distinc-
tion between true and false speech is that the Supreme Court has held, 
at least for media defendants, that an alleged defamation must be 
“provably” false to be actionable under the First Amendment.98 “Prov-
                                                                                                                      
96 See, e.g., McNeil-PPC, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 249. The court explained: 
Typically, an implied claim [of falsehood] is proven through the use of a con-
sumer survey that shows a substantial percentage of consumers are taking 
away the message that the plaintiff contends the advertising is conveying. 
Cases have held that 20% would constitute a substantial percentage of con-
sumers. Survey results are useful and have “evidentiary value” if the surveys 
are properly designed and objectively and fairly conducted—for example, 
they employ “filters” to screen out individuals whose responses may distort 
the results; the questions are directed to the “real issues”; and the questions 
are not leading or suggestive. 
Id. (citations omitted). Ahead of the courts in evidentiary methodology, some social scien-
tists are advocating use of randomized trials to determine perceptions of advertising. See 
Rex Briggs & Greg Stuart, What Sticks: Why Most Advertising Fails and How to 
Guarantee Yours Succeeds 243–50 (2006); see also Guzelian, Scientific Speech, supra note 
39, at 901 n.68 (listing psychological metrics citations). 
97 Heary Bros. Lightning Prot. Co. v. Lightning Prot. Inst., 287 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1048 
(D. Ariz. 2003) (“Different courts have taken different positions on whether speech that is 
. . . false or misleading may constitute ‘improper’ or unreasonable conduct that can form 
the basis of antitrust liability.”). 
98 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19–20; see also Vogel v. Felice, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350, 360, 361 
(Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]n order to support a defamation claim, the challenged statement 
must be found to convey ‘a provably false factual assertion.’ . . . If the meaning conveyed 
cannot by its nature be proved false, it cannot support a libel claim.”). The Court in Milk-
ovich found its earlier decision in Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986), 
to mean that: 
[A] statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before 
there can be liability under state defamation law, at least in situations . . . 
where a media defendant is involved. Thus, unlike the statement, “In my opi-
nion Mayor Jones is a liar,” the statement, “In my opinion Mayor Jones shows 
his abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx and Lenin,” would 
not be actionable. 
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ability” is an evidentiary standard. Yet current legal rules of evidence 
are not actually intended to distinguish truth from falsity, despite 
common assumptions to the contrary. What can be “proven” —that is, 
what will convince a jury or judge—is not necessarily true, and what can 
be proven false is not necessarily false.99 Therefore, the Supreme Court 
has invoked an unpredictable rule of evidence in stating that speech con-
tent must be “provably” false. 
 There is, however, an evidentiary rule that would distinguish falsity 
from truthfulness predictably: knowably false speech.100 Scientific speech 
in particular can be determined to be knowably false.101 Therefore, 
false scientific speech liability is the most, if not the only, predictable 
false-speech liability. 
V. False Scientific Speech = Predictable False Speech 
 In the previous Parts, we saw that a predictable definition of false 
speech requires: (1) a focus on audience perception, not literal speech; 
(2) that it be known that the speaker caused the false perception; and 
(3) that the speech content be known to be false. Only one form of false 
speech clearly meets these requirements: false scientific speech. Let us 
consider reasons why false scientific speech better meets the predict-
able definition of false speech than other forms of speech. 
 Knowable Falsity. Science has unique principles and methods that 
allow anyone not just to prove, but, by systematically appraising the best 
available scientific evidence, to transparently and accurately know the 
truth or falsity of an implicated scientific proposition.102 It is worth tak-
ing a minute to explain what is meant when we say science is unique in 
having “knowable” propositions. 
 There are two categories of false perceptions that can give rise to 
false scientific speech liability: (1) a perception that science has resolved 
a particular causal relationship to be a fact or impossibility, when sci-
ence has not; or (2) a perception that science has not reached a conclu-
sion about a proposition, when it has. Notice that we have emphasized 
in the previous two sentences that the issue of whether something is 
                                                                                                                      
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19–20 (footnote omitted). 
99 See Guzelian, Scientific Speech, supra note 39, at 886–93; see also Christopher P. Guze-
lian, Did Daubert Rid Courtrooms of Advocacy Science?, in Scientific Evidence Review: 
Current Issues at the Crossroads of Science, Technology and the Law 39, 41–43 
(Cynthia H. Cwik & Helen E. Witt eds., 2006) [hereinafter Guzelian, Advocacy Science]. 
100 See Guzelian, Scientific Speech, supra note 39, at 889–91. 
101 See id. at 890–91. 
102 See id. at 886–93. 
2010] True and False Speech 697 
known depends on what science says. Determining whether scientific 
speech is true or false does not turn on a judgment about the truth of 
what is actually happening out there in the universe. It turns on a 
judgment about the truth of what science can say is going on out there 
in the universe. These two previous sentences may sound the same be-
cause science supposedly describes what actually goes on out there in 
the universe. But they are not. 
 An absurd example can clarify the difference. Say we humans re-
ally live in The Matrix.103 That is, we are brains hooked up to a diabolical 
supercomputer that manipulates our thoughts to make it seem like we 
are living in a world full of air, water, gravity, and blathering law review 
articles. Say scientists’ brains that are plugged into this Matrix convince 
the scientists that they are gathering extensive scientific evidence that 
indicates it is a scientific fact that light reflected from a rock causes an 
image to form on the back of your retina. Thus, although in actuality a 
rock does not cause a projection onto your retina (because neither 
rock nor light nor retina exists in the Matrix), it is nevertheless a known 
scientific fact that reflected light projects onto your retina (because the 
supercomputer convinced the scientists’ brains that they had con-
ducted “dispositive experiments”). 
 Most people regard scientific facts as depicting reality, but as our 
absurd example shows, it is possible (in a high-road, deep, and abstract 
philosophical sense) that they do not. So what must be known about a 
causal claim underlying any scientific speech is not its immutable truth, 
but rather, that science has conclusively generated an answer to it 
(making the claim a scientific fact or scientific impossibility) or has not 
yet done so (making the claim a scientific uncertainty).104 And this 
knowledge is derivable through evidence-based analysis. 
                                                                                                                      
103 See The Matrix (Warner Bros. Pictures 1999). 
104 Cf. Stephen Edelston Toulmin, The Uses of Argument 255 (1964). Toulmin 
states that: 
What has to be recognized . . . is that validity is an intra-field, not an inter-
field notion. Arguments within any field can be judged by standards appro-
priate within that field, and some will fall short; but it must be expected that 
the standards will be field-dependent, and that the merits to be demanded of 
an argument in one field will be found to be absent . . . from entirely merito-
rious arguments in another. 
Id. Nevertheless, it is critical to recognize that although Toulmin’s concept of intra-field 
limitations is fine, his concept of inter-field limitations does not apply to science as it does 
to any other topic, because science has no limits to its possible ontological domain. This 
aspect of science makes it unlike most (or possibly all) other forms of “argument.” 
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 Evidence-based analysis is skyrocketing in scientific fields as varied 
as medicine, human toxicology, engineering, dentistry, social sciences, 
and even baseball, precisely because scientists and policymakers are real-
izing that “opinion, experience, intuition, judgment, and scientific in-
ference” —even from the most respected authorities—simply do not 
allow knowledge of facts, impossibilities, and uncertainties.105 Yet courts, 
legislatures, and regulatory agencies currently still employ a witches’ 
brew of legal rules of scientific evidence said to permit scientific causa-
tion to be proven.106 Almost never, however, are these practices equiva-
lent to evidence-based analysis and the acquisition of scientific knowl-
edge. Instead, most are some combination of: (1) various non-scientific 
burden-of-proof standards (sometimes even misleadingly termed “scien-
tific standards”); and (2) officials’ or juries’ authoritative opinions about 
the relative plausibility of opposing expert witnesses’ scientific opin-
ions.107 Evidence-based analysis, by contrast, through a critical systematic 
                                                                                                                      
105 Philip S. Guzelian & Christopher P. Guzelian, Letter to the Editor, Authority-Based 
Explanation, 303 Science 1468, 1468, 1469 (2004) [hereinafter Guzelian & Guzelian, Au-
thority-Based Explanation]. 
106 See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
107 With particular focus on the judiciary, suggestions increasingly are voiced that the 
present adversarial expert witness system is not a suitable institutional environment for 
evidence-based logic (“EBL”). See, e.g., Guzelian, Advocacy Science, supra note 99, at 49–51; 
David H. Garabrant & Robert C. James, Letter to the Editor, Trichloroethylene and Cancer in 
Humans: Recognizing the Need for an Evidence Based Analysis, 212 Toxicology 80, 81–82 
(2005) (demonstrating in-court bias through a case study, judged against Evidence-Based 
standards, of an expert toxicologist); Joseph N. Gitlin et al., Comparison of “B” Readers’ Inter-
pretations of Chest Radiographs for Asbestos Related Changes, 11 Acad. Radiology 843, 855 
(2004) (noting that plaintiff-retained experts identified chest radiographs of asbestos 
claimants as positive in 95.9% of cases; neutral readers not retained in litigation identified 
as positive in 4.5% of instances); Nathan A. Schachtman, Silica Litigation: Screening, Schem-
ing & Suing (Wash. Legal Found. Working Paper Series No. 135, 2005) (reviewing statisti-
cal analysis that uncovered apparent attorney-coordinated mass expert witness fraud by B-
readers in silica mass tort litigation). 
Institutional obstacles to determining scientific knowledge are not limited to the judicial 
branch, however. Cf. John F. Pfaff & Christopher P. Guzelian, Evidence Based Policy 45–59 
(Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 976376, 2007), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=976376 (discussing how EBL can be included in the review of legislation and 
agency regulations); Alastair J.J. Wood et al., A Sad Day for Science at the FDA, 353 New Eng. J. 
Med. 1197 (2005) (scrutinizing the FDA’s delay in deciding whether to allow emergency 
contraception, despite the absence of adverse safety data); Harvey Silverglate, Science and the 
Au Pair Trial, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1997, at A18 (“Courts and legislatures have proved them-
selves not up to the task of developing a judicial method for reliably sifting out hard science 
from junk science. Perhaps this is a task that should not be undertaken by instruments of the 
state. Perhaps the medical and scientific communities should make themselves heard, and fill 
the breach.”). EBL, like science itself, is more communal than capitalistic—it is a monolithic, 
systematic, semi-altruistic coordinated endeavor to produce a single public good: scientific 
knowledge. Like any public good, knowledge is subject to illegitimate capture. What organ-
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review of the best available scientific evidence, distinguishes scientific 
pronouncements as either: (1) authority-based opinions (derived from 
expert intuition, experience, judgment, or inference based on evidence 
of insufficient quality); or (2) evidence-based conclusions (statements of 
objective scientific fact based exclusively upon a systematic analysis of 
the best available evidence).108 To be predictable, law must end its reli-
ance on expert scientific opinions and adopt an evidence-based analysis 
of any scientific issues before it, including those involved in scientific 
speech cases. Doing so will allow courts to know the truth or falsity of a 
proposition at issue. 
 Avoiding Semiotics Problems. Another reason that scientific speech is 
a more predictable form of speech is because it creates fewer worries 
about semiotics than does most false speech. (Semiotics, recall, suggests 
that false perceptions can arise for nearly any speech, and may be be-
yond the control of even the most cautious speaker.) Let’s consider an 
example to see why. 
 Imagine a speaker announces to a town meeting, “Let’s talk about 
the amount of arsenic found in your drinking water,” and also has an 
overhead picture of an arsenic poisoning victim displayed when saying 
this. A false perception of many in the audience may be that their drink-
ing water will kill them. Even if the audience members believe that false 
message, there is no false scientific speech liability unless the audience 
perceived that it is scientifically known that their arsenic dosages put 
them in jeopardy.109 To a greater extent than other perceptions, a belief 
that something is true because of a perception that science has estab-
lished it as a known fact is something the audience can consciously ar-
                                                                                                                      
izational behavior experts must therefore determine is what institutional structure—private 
or public, large or small, with redundant checks or not, constituted by which experts with 
which obligations, subject to what sort of staff turnover, etc.—is best capable of resisting in-
evitable and sustained politically or economically motivated efforts to subvert accurate evi-
dence-based determinations of what is scientific fact, impossibility, or uncertainty. Whether a 
case involves scientific speech or toxic torts, we have to ensure that evidence-based standards 
for assessing scientific causal knowledge are firmly in place up front, and that these rules, 
unlike so many rules, not change because of self-interests. 
108 Guzelian & Guzelian, Authority-Based Explanation, supra note 105, at 1468. 
109 Theoretically, there could be tort liability besides false scientific speech tort liability 
if a non-scientific perception (e.g. a historical occurrence) were knowably false. The U.S. 
Supreme Court, for instance, has held that the historical question of whether someone has 
committed perjury is a “provably” false issue. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 
20 (1990). We do not consider in this Article which other forms of, or under which cir-
cumstances, false-speech liability should exist. 
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ticulate.110 Survey data and other psychological metrics are therefore 
more credible in measuring perceptions of scientific speech.111 
 In sum, false scientific speech meets the predictable definition of 
false speech better than other forms of speech because the speech’s 
falsity is knowable and because the issue of whether the speech actually 
caused the injurious, false perceptions can be more accurately deter-
mined. For that reason, false scientific speech is the premier example 
of predictable false speech. 
 Finally, it is important to mention that this Article does not assess 
how the First Amendment could more predictably adjudicate non-
scientific false speech. The problem with any non-scientific proposition 
is precisely how to fashion a set of evidentiary rules that permit one to 
know its truth or falsity. Indeed, there is considerable philosophical de-
bate about whether the falsity of any speech besides false scientific 
speech is “knowably,” not just “provably,” false.112 We leave it to others 
to pick up that epistemological debate, which is central to improving 
the predictability of non-scientific speech liability. 
VI. Replacing Actual Malice with Predictable Negligence: 
Limiting Liability to Unnecessary, Avoidable Speech 
 Having addressed the problematic treatment that the definition of 
falsity receives in courts, it is essential that we return to another issue 
that is inextricably intertwined through precedent with false speech: 
actual malice. Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964, a plaintiff in false speech cases usually 
cannot prevail simply by showing that the defendant’s speech is false. 
Instead, a demonstration of actual malice is also typically necessary.113 
                                                                                                                      
110 See Guzelian, Scientific Speech, supra note 39, at 901 n.68 (citing articles that question 
use of surveys as reliable psychological metrics for unconscious preferences). 
111 See id. 
112 See id. at 893–98 (discussing historical, holistic, and political propositions, all of 
which cannot be known to be true or false). If no such speech were deemed to be know-
able, however, and the “knowability” evidentiary rule replaced “provability” as a require-
ment for all false speech lawsuits, we acknowledge that traditionally granted false-speech 
liability that turns on whether historical events have occurred might be precluded under 
the First Amendment. Cf. Groden v. Random House, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 1074 ( JSM), 1994 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11794, at *18–21 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1994) (rejecting false advertising 
claim because theory of a “grassy knoll shooter” in John F. Kennedy assassination is an 
unknowable historical proposition, and thus the proposition must be left open to public 
interpretation under the First Amendment). 
113 E.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281–82 (1964) (“‘[A]ny one claiming to 
be defamed by the communication must show actual malice or go remediless. This privilege 
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 Why is the unpredictable actual malice rule so frequently invoked 
in First Amendment cases? A simple but jaded answer suffices: because 
the rule makes it hard for plaintiffs to win First Amendment suits. As we 
showed early in this Article, actual malice is an unpredictable rule, so 
the actual malice rule has nothing to do with proper justice. But like 
our previous hypothetical rule that exonerates any speaker who is not 
an octogenarian with a purple mohawk, the rule is effective at quashing 
lawsuits (never mind that it does so for the wrong reasons). 
 The free speech absolutist retorts that without an accompanying 
rule of actual malice, false speech—even if rigorously defined as we 
have suggested in this Article—would suffer from something akin to 
strict liability, something even more unacceptable than unpredictable 
liability on First Amendment grounds.114 To avoid both strict liability 
and the unpredictable actual malice rule, some courts now invoke a 
negligence standard in some First Amendment contexts,115 yet com-
mentators frequently lament how unpredictable (and thus unsatisfac-
tory) negligence is as a rule, too.116 This is why, undoubtedly, negli-
gence has not yet found—and will probably never find—widespread 
usage as a First Amendment standard. 
 If actual malice is unacceptably unpredictable and strict liability is 
unacceptably broad, another rule must be constitutionalized to limit 
false-speech liability in a predictable way. More recently, a rigorous, 
predictable standard— “predictable” negligence—has been described 
in the academic literature. Predictable negligence prioritizes and limits 
liability by examining empirical evidence to eliminate only that risky 
behavior that is both (1) avoidable and (2) unnecessary. Though the 
general concept of predictable negligence has been reviewed exten-
sively elsewhere,117 we shall briefly explain the concepts of avoidable or 
unavoidable risks, and necessary or unnecessary risks as applied to the 
First Amendment context. 
                                                                                                                      
extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters of public concern, public men, 
and candidates for office.’” (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 285 (Kan. 1908))). 
114 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 19 cmt. d (1998) (“Most 
courts express[] concern that imposing strict liability for the dissemination of false and de-
fective information would significantly impinge on free speech . . . .”). 
115 See Guzelian, Scientific Speech, supra note 39, at 914–15. 
116 See Guzelian, Kindynamic Theory, supra note 16, at 1007–08. At least one scholar, 
however, proposes that “constitutional” negligence be adopted in First Amendment con-
texts. See Sacks, supra note 57. This form of negligence would amount to a First Amend-
ment balancing test as ostensibly envisioned in Sullivan and its progeny cases. See id. 
117 See Guzelian, Kindynamic Theory, supra note 16, at 1016–21; Guzelian, Scientific 
Speech, supra note 39, at 911–17. 
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A. Unavoidable Speech 
 The primary purpose of liability is to deter or force modification of 
risky behavior—whether speech, conduct, or product manufacture— 
such that the same kinds of mistakes will be avoided in the future.118 It 
makes no sense, therefore, to penalize unavoidable mistakes—mistakes 
that systematically recur regardless of whether liability is imposed.119 When 
liability is imposed on unavoidable false speech, the message sent is that 
people should omit from speaking at all, or worse, speak in a guarded, 
uncertain, and fearful fashion that will not eradicate the unavoidable 
errors, yet can paradoxically increase the frequency of other mistakes.120 
We suggest that false speech is avoidable if it is (1) serially made and (2) 
significantly captivating.121 Why these criteria? The first criterion exists 
because penalizing only serial false speech prevents catastrophic sanc-
tions for one-time slips of the tongue.122 And the second criterion— sig-
nificantly captivating speech—permits penalization of speech that 
causes false perceptions only in large or mainstream, not small or fringe, 
audiences, which is appropriate because speech causing outlier injuries 
                                                                                                                      
118 See Guzelian, Kindynamic Theory, supra note 16, at 991. 
119 It is a complicated and critical task to reliably identify exactly which specific risks 
created by a tortfeasor are irreducible. See University of Michigan Center for the Study of 
Complex Systems, The Study of Complex Systems, http://www.cscs.umich.edu/old/com- 
plexity.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2010) (identifying common characteristics of a complex 
system). But see Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and 
Nuclear Weapons 28 (1993) (“The belief that intelligent design and management will 
result in complex organizations that are capable of safely operating . . . is an illusion 
. . . .”). 
120 W. Edwards Deming, a renowned statistician and corporate consultant who revolu-
tionized Japanese industry after World War II, stressed that punishing individuals (other 
than managers) for their communications and actions would doom corporations to fail-
ure. See W. Edwards Deming, Out of the Crisis 18–96 (1986) (discussing the Deming 
Management Method’s “Fourteen Points,” including “drive out fear” from individuals for 
their personal mistakes). 
121 Guzelian, Scientific Speech, supra note 39, at 911 n.93. 
122 Unfortunately, catastrophes (speech that only rarely results in injury, but has wide-
spread and/or significant impact when it does) are sometimes unavoidable, too. See Rich-
ard A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Catastrophe 21–71 (2004) (describing natural 
and unintended man-made catastrophes). The problem with catastrophe deterrence is 
that the particularly stubborn psychological response to any catastrophe, even unavoidable 
ones, is to assign liability—and yet it is no more sensible to hold someone liable for an 
irreducible catastrophic error than it is for an irreducible trivial one. Leading scholars 
observe that courts are at least weakly sensitive to public sentiment and emotion. See Law-
rence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1785, 1795 (1997). If that is true, it suggests that liability may be less predictable 
precisely when serious injuries do occur. See id. at 1801–11 (discussing “contested” versus 
“uncontested” issues and Supreme Court decision making). 
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cannot be accurately predicted.123 (It may also not be worth expending 
judicial resources on inconsequential injuries.) Thus, as has been said: 
[Determining whether false speech is avoidable] could turn 
on a speaker’s communicative reach—her capacity to “captivate” 
audiences with a false implication. In the context of risk 
communication, for instance[,] “[t]here might be merit to al-
lowing risk communicators with smaller ‘reach’ (i.e., audience 
size) more leeway to make mistakes because they affect fewer 
listeners. . . . Conversely, . . . [less tolerance will be shown] for 
the mass media, which have large ‘reach.’” . . . 
 . . . [A] speaker with “significant” communicative reach has 
the ability by speaking (perhaps on a series of occasions) to 
increase the number of people who take her opinion as scien-
tific fact, or, vice versa, are persuaded by her speech that an-
other’s recitation of a scientific fact is only that individual’s 
personal opinion. The more a society values freedom of 
speech, the higher the threshold of audience capture will 
need to be before the misleading opinion is said to have “sig-
nificant” reach.124 
 Appropriate protocols for this empirical, antitrust-like approach to 
speech must obviously be developed in detail, but the point is clear: 
false speech that can be avoided, should be. It is also clear, though, that 
law must make allowances to prevent incidental or inconsequential 
speech from being penalized, lest too much proper speech be deterred 
through liability. 
                                                                                                                      
123 See supra notes 80–97 and accompanying text (discussing general and specific causa-
tion for speech). Justice White favored this rationale in determining what speech should be 
assessed liability: “[I]t makes no sense to give the most protection to those publishers who 
reach the most readers and therefore pollute the channels of communication with the most 
misinformation and do the most damage . . . .” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 773 (1985) (White, J., concurring). Note that Justice White focuses upon 
those actors who most significantly add pollution to the stream of information, rather than 
those actors who generate the pollution in the first place. White’s First Amendment rationale 
comports well with the modern judicial position that the First Amendment does not grant a 
“neutral reportage privilege” (i.e. First Amendment protection where the media act merely as 
a conduit and report in accurate fashion another individual’s false statement). See, e.g., Nor-
ton v. Glenn, 860 A.2d 48, 57 (Pa. 2004). Compare Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious 
Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 59–68 (1993) (calling for risk management 
prioritization as a result of decreasing marginal returns in the reduction of risks), with Cass 
R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environment, at viii–x, 8–9 (2002) 
(extolling a sensible system of risk regulation found in the idea of a cost-benefit state). 
124 Guzelian, Scientific Speech, supra note 39, at 920, 921 (quoting Guzelian, Liability & 
Fear, supra note 56, at 845–46) (footnotes omitted). 
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B. Necessary Speech 
 Predictable liability exists only for speech or other behavior that 
amounts to needless, not necessary, risks.125 A necessary risky behavior 
(either speech or conduct) is exempted from liability because the inju-
rious speech or conduct is on balance necessary. This means that there 
is no presently known way to make the speech or behavior safer without 
an unacceptable loss of accompanying benefits or an unacceptable in-
crease in accompanying risks. 
 In tort law, courts often consider concurrent risks and benefits 
when determining whether to impose liability on particular conduct. 
Eliminating one avoidable significant risk can give rise to another sig-
nificant risk. For example, designing a lamp pole to collapse easily in a 
vehicular collision decreases the risk of injury to drivers, but the modifi-
cation may simultaneously convert a previously insignificant risk of in-
jury to nearby pedestrians into one that is significant.126 If that is the 
case, it is sometimes better to accept the original behavior without modi-
fication. The riskiness of the conduct or product is, in other words, nec-
essary. 
 Similar thinking could apply to false speech. Elimination of some 
instances of significantly injurious, avoidable false speech might force 
so much useful truthful information that is simultaneously being 
broadcast to be lost that it is not appropriate to punish the false speech. 
Thus, despite the fact that the false speech is avoidable and injurious, it 
might be necessary in some instances to accept it because accompany-
ing benefits would have otherwise been lost, or other still-worse harms 
would have been incurred, had the speech been modified or entirely 
omitted. 
C. Summary Remarks on Predictable Negligence 
 From our brief discussion, one can see that “avoidable-and-
unnecessary risk” liability (i.e. predictable negligence) is conceptually 
                                                                                                                      
125 See Guzelian, Kindynamic Theory, supra note 16, at 1016–21. The author invokes the 
term “proximate risk” to describe a “needless risk” in the Kindynamic article, but the con-
cept is the same. See id. at 1017–18. 
126 See Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 403 N.E.2d 391, 396–98 (Mass. 1980) (concluding 
that pedestrian risk of injury became too significant and hence defendant was negligent 
for designing breakaway pole to protect drivers). But see Ind. Consol. Ins. Co. v. Mathew, 
402 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (finding no negligence where defendant im-
mediately fled plaintiff’s garage after mower caught fire instead of pushing mower outside 
first, because the expected risk of harm to the garage was less than the expected risk of 
injury from tending to a potentially explosive mower). 
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different from both traditional negligence and strict liability. Unlike 
strict liability, predictable negligence limits liability. Unlike actual mal-
ice, predictable negligence does not turn on a speaker’s intent, but 
rather on how effectively the speech has spread a pernicious false idea. 
And unlike traditional negligence, predictable negligence does not turn 
on a subjective “reasonability” standard, but rather on a quantified, evi-
dence-based standard designed to deter avoidable, unnecessary risks. 
False-speech liability, therefore, should be associated with predictable 
negligence, rather than with strict liability or actual malice standards.127 
VII. Predictability Is a Universal Legal Imperative, Not Just a 
First Amendment One 
 In this Article so far, we have discussed several ways in which to 
modify the legal understanding of “falsity,” and have discussed how to 
limit liability so that legal liability for false speech can be more predict-
able. In this section, however, we demonstrate that many of these con-
siderations are not limited to false speech or even First Amendment 
cases. They are instead necessary factors in making any form of liability 
more predictable. Thus, the factors that make false-speech liability pre-
dictable are not a set of special legal considerations for First Amend-
ment cases, but are, for the most part, the same factors that generally 
comprise predictable legal liability. 
A. The Universal Judicial Need to Know Facts 
 As was noted previously, a major challenge in making any speech 
liability more predictable is semiotics (speech causation).128 One must 
know that a perception did not simply arise out of unpredictable chaos, 
but that the speaker’s particular kind of communication caused that in-
                                                                                                                      
127 A recent U.S. Supreme Court case has cautioned strongly against the indiscriminate 
application of a balancing test: “‘Whether a given category of speech enjoys First Amend-
ment protection depends upon a categorical balancing of the value of the speech against 
its societal costs.’” United States v. Stevens, No. 08-769, slip op. at 7 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2010). 
The predictable negligence test we are proposing here, however, which admittedly engages 
in a form of balancing, is nevertheless permissible because the category of the speech being 
dealt with—false speech such as fraud or defamation—is traditionally recognized as unpro-
tected speech by the Court. See id. at 8 (permitting a balancing test when the analysis is 
historically “grounded . . . in a previously recognized, long-established category of unpro-
tected speech” content). 
128 See supra notes 80–97 and accompanying text. 
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jurious perception.129 If that is not known, speech liability will not be 
predictable.130 
 The difficulties that courts are facing with the speech causation is-
sue are, not surprisingly, influencing courtroom evidentiary standards. 
At the heart of several First Amendment challenges, most recently vio-
lent video game lawsuits, courts are requiring a heightened evidentiary 
showing of speech causation before imposing speech liability.131 Courts 
effectively require that speech be known to cause a litigated harm before 
liability is imposed, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
                                                                                                                      
129 Chaos theorists have not yet convincingly demonstrated that chaotically formed re-
sults, if they in fact exist in reality, are predictable from computer and experimental modeling 
methodologies. If that changes some day, the additional category—predictable chaos—might 
allow for additional liability to be placed upon speakers. See generally James Gleick, Chaos 
(1988)(discussing the study of chaos) 
130 This statement would be subject to revision if complexity and chaos scientists could 
reliably predict how speech in a condition-sensitive (chaotic) environment influences an 
emergent perception. To date, they have been unable to do so. See id. 
131 See, e.g., Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 959 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (enjoining enforcement of statute limiting sales or rentals of violent video games 
to minors because county failed to present “substantial supporting evidence” of an empirical 
nature for its belief that the games caused psychological harm to minors); Am. Amusement 
Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We must consider whether the 
City of Indianapolis has . . . grounds for thinking that violent video games cause harm either 
to the game players or . . . the public at large. The grounds must be compelling and not 
merely plausible.”); Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328–29, 330–31 (7th Cir. 
1985) (holding that state is not permitted to selectively regulate pornographic speech on the 
basis of state’s perception of “truth” about potential for dehumanization of and violence 
against women). But see United States v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621, 623, 630 (9th Cir. 2004) (up-
holding injunction prohibiting author from publishing and distributing a book advising 
readers that federal income taxes are illegal and that taxpayers can legally avoid paying 
them); Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 255, 263–65 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
publisher of an instruction manual on murder could be found liable for aiding and abetting 
the commission of a crime and that cause of action was not barred by the First Amendment 
because Brandenburg [v. Ohio] did not protect the publisher); Weirum v. RKO, 539 P.2d 36, 40 
(Cal. 1975) (holding radio station liable for hosting on-air contest that resulted in a fatal car 
race). 
With regard to false commercial speech, the Supreme Court interestingly has created 
a First Amendment distinction between speech that is actually misleading, and speech that 
is only potentially misleading. (Actually or inherently misleading commercial speech may be 
prohibited entirely, but “[s]tates may not completely ban potentially misleading speech if 
narrower limitations can ensure that the information is presented in a nonmisleading 
manner.” Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 152 (1994); see also 
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).) Actually misleading commercial speech seems to 
require scientific knowledge that the speech caused injurious false perceptions. What is un-
clear, however, is what modicum of scientific evidence (short of scientific knowledge) suf-
fices to say that commercial speech is potentially misleading—that is, that the speech has 
potentially caused injurious false perceptions, but is not known to have done so. Predictable 
tort rules generally do not permit liability if an alleged source of an injury is not known to 
cause the injury. See Guzelian, Kindynamic Theory, supra note 16, at 1010–16. 
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held in its 2003 decision in Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis 
County: 
[A] psychologist . . . stated that a recent study that he con-
ducted indicates that playing violent video games “does in fact 
lead to aggressive behavior in the immediate situation . . . that 
more aggressive thoughts are reported and there is frequently 
more aggressive behavior.” But this vague generality falls far 
short of a showing that video games are psychologically dele-
terious. . . . 
 Before the County may constitutionally restrict the speech at 
issue here, the County must come forward with empirical 
support for its belief that “violent” video games cause psycho-
logical harm to minors. . . . [It] has failed to present the “sub-
stantial supporting evidence” of harm that is required before an ordi-
nance that threatens protected speech can be upheld. . . . [T]he 
County may not simply surmise that it is serving a compelling 
state interest because “[s]ociety in general believes that con-
tinued exposure to violence can be harmful to children[.]” 
Where first amendment rights are at stake, “the Government must 
present more than anecdote and supposition.”132 
 The Eighth Circuit asserts that it is the First Amendment that re-
quires speech causation to be, in effect, known. Judicial expectations 
that facts be known are hardly limited to First Amendment cases, how-
ever.133 By an increasingly common reasoning, judicial liability always 
requires knowledge of facts. For example, the Eighth Circuit’s “First 
                                                                                                                      
132 Interactive Digital Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 958–59 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
133 In a rough analogy to semiotics, products liability tort suggests that consumer ex-
pectations may be assessed intersubjectively, although courts often misleadingly refer to 
these beliefs as “objective.” See Nanut v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 94-16948, 1996 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 15342, at *5–6 (9th Cir. June 24, 1996). In Nanut the court held that a woman 
suing for recovery as a result of an allegedly defective tampon design, after contracting 
toxic shock syndrome, failed to demonstrate defect because: 
[t]he declaration set forth [the plaintiff’s] subjective beliefs of the risk of harm 
associated with the use of tampons. Under the consumer expectations test, 
the court need consider only the expectations of the “ordinary” consumer. 
This test is a purely objective standard. “In determining whether a product’s 
safety satisfies . . . [consumer expectations], the jury considers the expecta-
tions of a hypothetical, reasonable consumer, rather than those of the par-
ticular plaintiff in the case.” 
Id. (quoting Campbell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 233 n.6 (Cal. 1982)) (citation 
omitted). 
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Amendment” evidentiary standard of causation is quite similar to the 
standard of causal knowledge that the Texas Supreme Court required 
in its 1997 decision in the toxic tort case Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. v. Havner.134 
 Yet outside of a First Amendment context, some jurists still vehe-
mently resist this concept that facts must be known before liability can 
be imposed. In In re Ephedra Products Liability Litigation, a 2005 case re-
garding an alleged causal relationship between consumption of the diet 
drug Ephedra and cardiac injuries, Judge Jed Rakoff of the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York clarified that non-
definitive scientific evidence can be used to establish a causal relation-
ship.135 Judge Rakoff’s accommodation of expert speculation about sci-
entific propositions contradicts Judge Posner’s and the Texas Supreme 
Court’s beliefs that legal liability should “lag” science in any context— 
First Amendment or otherwise. Judge Rakoff’s view implies that, at least 
in some circumstances, liability should be imposed even if litigated 
questions of fact cannot be definitively answered. In other words, Judge 
Rakoff believes that liability for scientific uncertainties (“uncertainty li-
ability”) is sometimes appropriate.136 
 This foregoing debate about whether to permit uncertainty liabil-
ity raises critical questions: If the standards for determining a question 
of fact vary depending on whether a lawsuit is a First Amendment, per-
sonal injury tort, or antitrust matter, does that variation cause liability 
to be unpredictable? Is it appropriate that courts require scientific 
knowledge about some factual propositions (e.g. speech causation mat-
ters) because “fundamental” constitutional rights are on the line (e.g. 
freedom of speech), but permit liability based on purely subjective specu-
lation137 about scientific uncertainties if “inferior” constitutional rights 
                                                                                                                      
134 953 S.W.2d 706, 727, 728 (Tex. 1997) (“Courts should not embrace inferences that 
good science would not draw. . . . As Judge Posner has said, ‘[l]aw lags science; it does not 
lead it.’” (quoting Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996)) (citations 
omitted)). 
135 393 F. Supp. 2d 181, 190, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that “[i]nconclusive science 
is not the same as junk science”). 
136 Judge Rakoff writes: “Although this [uncertainty] legal standard may lead to what 
some scientists might consider an unacceptably high error rate in jury verdicts, the law has 
tolerated the jury error rate for centuries because it has not yet found a better way of ad-
judicating disputes.” Id. at 193. But see Guzelian, Scientific Speech, supra note 39, at 886–93 
(explaining how evidence-based logic can establish scientific truth). Whether Judge Rakoff 
believes uncertainty liability for questions of speech causation is appropriate is not clear. 
137 Despite some creative attempts, currently no known objective standards exist by 
which to reliably judge how likely a scientific uncertainty is of being true. See, e.g., Sanya 
Mitaim & Bart Kosko, The Shape of Fuzzy Sets in Adaptive Function Approximation, 9 IEEE 
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or statutory rights are at issue? Should courts even be permitted to 
sometimes impose liability based on expert opinions that contradict sci-
entific facts?138 
 False scientific speech is an ideal vehicle for seeing the trouble 
with using subjective, non-scientific standards to evaluate questions of 
scientific fact—regardless of whether speech or conduct is at issue. 
False scientific speech always involves at least two questions of fact: (1) 
the validity of the speech causation question (“Did the speech cause the 
alleged injury?”), and (2) the validity of the scientific proposition or 
propositions that constitute the speech’s content (“Is the proposition 
contained in the speech true?”). Thus, when it is said the First Amend-
ment requires “substantial supporting [scientific] evidence” to permit 
speech liability, it means there must be knowledge about not only the 
speech causation question, but also the scientific proposition or propo-
sitions embedded in the speech’s content. 
 Let us say we were to adopt Judge Rakoff’s view that uncertainty 
liability is permissible, depending on the type of lawsuit. (For instance, 
uncertainty liability is okay for toxic tort suits, but not for First 
Amendment suits.) The unsettling implication of such reasoning is that 
the same question of fact—say, whether it is true that a single physical 
blow to the chest can cause breast cancer139—could be at issue in a false 
scientific speech case and in a torts case, but based solely on the type of 
lawsuit being litigated, there would be different answers to that same sci-
                                                                                                                      
Transactions on Fuzzy Systems 637, 637 (2001) (attempting to identify best fuzzy set 
shapes for identifying engineering function attributes under uncertainty, but suggesting 
that even partly successful approximations are best achieved through complex fuzzy sets 
whose shapes—determined from incomplete evidence—are not descriptively or philoso-
phically intuitive); Paolo F. Ricci et al., Precautionary Principles: A Jurisdiction-Free Framework 
for Decision-Making Under Risk, 23 Hum. & Experimental Toxicology 579, 589–95 (2004) 
(presenting decision analysis framework that offers reproducibility and formal structure 
for making precautionary decisions about uncertainties). Assessments of the truth or fal-
sity of scientific uncertainties are therefore always rank speculation, even if these assess-
ments are couched in probabilistic terms. See Philip S. Guzelian et al., Evidence-Based Toxi-
cology: A Comprehensive Framework for Causation, 24 Hum. & Experimental Toxicology 161, 
187–92 (2005) (cautioning against quantification of uncertainty likelihoods). 
138 Cf. Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 604, 
618, 619 (1994) (arguing that “[t]he hope to systematize proof . . . will happen in science, 
as in the law, only when we already know all there is to know, and thus only when scientific 
and legal inquiry no longer serve a purpose”). 
139 See Dempsey v. Hartley, 94 F. Supp. 918, 919–20 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (permitting dam-
ages against defendant driver for an automobile accident plaintiff who suffered a bruised 
sternum and sore breasts that resulted in “considerable . . . pain” while breathing and fear 
of breast cancer, despite own expert physician’s testimony that breast cancer is not caused 
by physical impact). 
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entific question. The upshot of permitting uncertainty liability is that 
courts will reach different conclusions about the same questions of fact, 
depending only on what type of lawsuit is being heard.140 Uncertainty 
liability is unpredictable liability. 
 Indeed, even those who favor uncertainty liability, like Judge Ra-
koff, appear to recognize how unpredictable uncertainty liability can be 
because they affirm that testifying experts must not be allowed to rep-
resent scientific uncertainties as facts in court. “[Courts must] prohibit 
an expert witness from testifying that causality has been established ‘to 
a reasonable degree of scientific certainty’ when the very exacting stan-
dards for determining scientific certainty have not been met.”141 
 Judge Rakoff’s latter statement brings us to another critical point. 
Regardless of their views about permitting uncertainty liability, judges 
seem to be in agreement that the judiciary must be as truthful and 
transparent as possible about the fact that uncertainty liability is based 
on subjective beliefs, not science.142 Indeed, courts perpetually and suc-
cessfully represent themselves to the citizenry as the government insti-
tutions that dispassionately decide “truth.” Most laypeople take that 
statement at its face value—that courts investigate and determine, per-
haps no less rigorously than scientists at a conference might, whether a 
particular contention is a fact. This view of legal “truth” was one held by 
Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in his dissent in Johnson v. 
United States.143 But more recently, a shift in jurists’ conception of truth 
                                                                                                                      
140 This result is even more problematic when one considers that such findings of fact 
not only influence future case rulings, but are binding on some third-party litigants via 
collateral estoppel. 
141 In re Ephedra, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 190. Observe that Judge Rakoff mistakenly looks to 
a literal aspect of expert testimony—whether experts state that their conclusions reflect “a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty” —to decide its propriety. Literalism is not the 
legal test of a speech’s truth or falsity; audience (here, jury) perception is. See supra notes 
59–79 and accompanying text. 
142 Some may object and say that without being able to mislead the citizenry, no uncer-
tainty or precautionary liability will be possible, because people do not fear uncertainties 
sufficiently to motivate them to act. Though this psychological phenomenon may be true, 
validating false perceptions is not a democratically legitimate way to engender political and 
social support for preemptive actions. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 405 n.2 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Harlan clarifies: 
It is undeniable that falsity may be published, especially in the political arena, 
with what may be considered “good” motives—for example a good-faith belief 
in the absolute necessity of defeating an “evil” candidate. But the Court does not 
remove state power to control such conduct, thus underlining the strong social interest 
in discouraging false publication. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
143 333 U.S. 46, 53–54 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter states: 
 
2010] True and False Speech 711 
seems to be occurring. Judge Robert D. Sack of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit views legal “truth” as a legal fiction to dis-
pose of a disputed matter, not as an end purpose of litigation.144 
 True, courts settle disputes, but the perception of most non-
lawyers is that en route to dispute settlement, courts accurately identify 
facts. Few non-lawyers understand a legal “finding of fact,” like “Chemi-
cal X causes cancer,” to be referring merely to an expensive, time-
consuming, legally binding, arbitrary (or worse, subjective) process of 
selecting between competing expert opinions, which is no more likely 
than a coin flip of being correct, and done only to ensure expeditious 
case administration. Moreover, almost no one would accept as “truth” 
that the same scientific finding of fact could differ depending only on 
what sort of lawsuit—First Amendment or otherwise—were at issue. 
 In close, we must recognize three things about fact-finding. First, 
uncertainty liability is unpredictable and undermines the Rule of 
Law.145 Second, the judiciary is probably the inappropriate government 
                                                                                                                      
While a court room is not a laboratory for the scientific pursuit of truth, a tri-
al judge is surely not confined to an account, obviously fragmentary, of the 
circumstances of a happening . . . when he has at his command the means of 
exploring them fully, or at least more fully, before passing legal judgment. A 
trial is not a game of blind man’s buff; and the trial judge . . . need not blind-
fold himself . . . simply because the parties, for reasons of trial tactics, choose 
to withhold . . . testimony. 
 Federal judges are not referees at prize-fights but functionaries of justice. 
As such they have a duty of initiative to see that the issues are determined 
within the scope of the pleadings, not left to counsel’s chosen argument. . . . 
[A judge] surely has the duty to do so before resorting to guesswork in estab-
lishing liability for fault. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
144 Sack, Sack on Defamation, supra note 59, § 3.12, at 3-30 to -33. Judge Sack states: 
[A]t the end of a trial in which facts are contested, irrespective of what the 
trier of fact concludes, each side’s “truth” is likely to be diametrically opposite 
from what the other side is equally sure is true. Trials rarely change that con-
viction. Nor should they. 
 The purpose of litigation is to settle disputes, not to establish truth. 
 . . . . 
 . . . Truth . . . is a construct, a legal fiction, decided with finality so that the 
matter may be disposed of and [litigants] may get on with their lives. 
Id. 
145 In defense of uncertainty liability, one can protest that practical limitations sometimes 
frustrate the acquisition of scientific knowledge. This is true. Still, the existence of such limi-
tations—ethics, cost, time, or the difficulty (or impossibility) of adequate study design—does 
not grant us the freedom to move the evidentiary goalposts closer in deciding what is scien-
tifically certain. We simply must admit that science does not, and perhaps cannot, know. Un-
derstandably, scientists, public advocacy groups, crisis managers, and safety experts may still 
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branch to enforce or endorse uncertainty liability because of courts’ 
credibility as the “apolitical” branch.146 Third, and most importantly for 
this Article’s purposes, it is not the First Amendment that generates the 
need that facts be known before liability is imposed. It is a universal 
need that stems from courts’ general function as adjudicators of truth. 
B. The Universal Judicial Means to Know Facts 
 In this Article, we described evidence-based analysis as necessary 
for knowing, not simply proving, scientific speech’s truth or falsity.147 
Nevertheless, evidence-based analysis is necessary for identifying scien-
tific facts in any area of law, not just in scientific speech cases. Such 
practice is necessary in predictably adjudicating false scientific speech. 
But it is equally important in any other area of law in which the deter-
mined answer to a scientific question will influence the outcome of a 
case. And if courts, as we pointed out in the last section, are responsible 
for being purveyors of truth, then they should welcome and adhere to 
evidence-based analysis in all areas of law, not just in matters of scien-
tific speech and First Amendment law. 
C. The Universal Need to Establish Predictable Limitations on Liability 
 It is an incorrect but common understanding that concerns about 
strict liability for false speech spring from a First Amendment origin. 
Instead, worries about unlimited liability arise whenever liability can be 
imposed.148 Obviously, neither First Amendment nor tort law holds 
                                                                                                                      
want or need to make pronouncements on an inferential or speculative basis. Journalists may 
be inclined to report on such uncertainties to the general population, too. Actions and 
communication about uncertain harms are defended by reference to the Precautionary 
Principle: “it is better to be safe than sorry.” See V. Dethlefsen et al., The Precautionary Principle: 
Towards Anticipatory Environmental Management, in Clean Production Strategies: Develop-
ing Preventive Environmental Management in the Industrial Economy 41, 41–62 
(Tim Jackson ed., 1993) (examining the impetus for the emergence of the precautionary 
principle and different formulations of the principle). But such speculation has no place in 
the judiciary—whether in a First Amendment context or otherwise. 
146 How courts should review other branches’ uncertainty liability decisions and legisla-
tive enactments is still not clear, and merits much more extensive discussions. At least one 
Supreme Court decision seems to suggest, in passing, that those branches too may have to 
limit themselves to liability or regulation based on scientific certainties. See Indus. Union 
Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656 n.62 (1980) (“[A regulatory agency] must 
support its finding that a certain level of risk exists by substantial evidence . . . .”). 
147 See supra notes 102–112 and accompanying text. 
148 See Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering, 35 St. Louis U. L.J. 623, 645–46 
(1991) (explaining how the theory of absolute liability as a cheap risk-spreading device to 
help poor consumers is “based on incompetent notions of what insurance is”). Professor 
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every instance of every behavior strictly liable. Law instead frequently 
fashions liability-limiting rules to avoid strict liability. Upon closer in-
spection, however, many of these rules—in contexts other than the First 
Amendment—are as unpredictable as the actual malice rule.149 
 Earlier in this Article, we saw that Justice Byron White criticized 
the actual malice rule as unpredictable.150 Thus, even if strict liability 
has considerable problems, putting unpredictable limitations (like ac-
tual malice) on it is not a solution, regardless of whether the context is 
a First Amendment suit or instead a tort or criminal liability matter. In-
stead, predictable negligence, which we have described above in a First 
Amendment context,151 has also been proposed as a mechanism for 
improving the predictability of liability and at the same time limiting 
liability appropriately in general tort and criminal contexts.152 
                                                                                                                      
Krauss may be correct to pin partial responsibility for the expansion of strict liability on 
early scholars like Prosser or James, but it was really the law and economics movement that 
guaranteed strict liability’s proliferation. Prominent law and economics scholars theorized 
that, under rational economic assumptions, quite often there is either no difference in the 
deterrent effects of strict liability and negligence liability or that strict liability is economically 
preferable to negligence liability. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis 18–20 (1970) (noting that it is a myth that there is one 
unalterable economic law stating the “right” way to distribute accident losses); Steven 
Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 5–46 (1987) (demonstrating that in 
many instances, the answer to whether a negligence or strict rule is economically prefer-
able is indeterminate under rational choice assumptions); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of 
Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 32–34 (1972) (arguing that responsibility, especially in civil 
law, should be placed on the person who is in the best place to most cheaply avoid the 
loss). But see A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 123 (3d 
ed. 2003) (“When all of the effects of product liability rules are taken into account—on 
the producers’ care, on the victims’ care, on industry output, and on risk allocation—it is 
clear that, in general no one [liability] rule will be best in every respect.”). By gutting the 
traditional distinction between negligence and strict liability, law and economics created a 
common intuition that many injurious behaviors should be subjected to various forms of 
strict liability. 
149 Guzelian, Kindynamic Theory, supra note 16, at 1009 (using the “zone of danger” rule 
as an example of an unpredictable rule and one that “maintain[s] the false public belief that 
individual justice is being done”). For related ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, Code Version 
2.0, at 132–36 (2006) (discussing illegitimacy and dangers of indirect laws and regulations); 
Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 
Harv. L. Rev. 625, 665–67 (1984) (contending that selective transmission to the public of 
rules governing decisionmakers’ adjudications is a questionable practice). 
150 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. This is because actual malice is not a risk-
based rule. It is instead focused on intent, which has little to do with the riskiness of a be-
havior or speech. 
151 See supra notes 113–126 and accompanying text. 
152 See Guzelian, Kindynamic Theory, supra note 16, at 1016–21; Pfaff & Guzelian, supra 
note 107, at 31–45. 
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D. Summary Remarks About the Universality of Predictable Liability 
 This section has described the universal need for trustworthy judi-
cial derivation of truth and falsity, not just in a First Amendment con-
text. Moreover, we have shown here and elsewhere that the means for 
distinguishing between true and false scientific statements of fact are 
the same in any legal context. Thus, objections to the modifications we 
are endorsing in a First Amendment context—even if they are couched 
as “defenses of free speech” —are logically indistinguishable from ob-
jections to a trustworthy means of distinguishing scientific truth and 
falsity in any legal context. 
 Secondly, we have proposed reliable limitations upon liability in a 
First Amendment context that departs from the current unpredictable 
precedent of actual malice and other unreliable standards. Similar de-
parture from unpredictable precedent is required in tort and criminal 
law to achieve rational limitations upon liability. Thus, the matter is 
again not one of First Amendment origin, and cannot be protested on 
First Amendment grounds. Instead, it requires reconsideration of how 
liability is limited as a general legal matter. 
VIII. Worries About Liability: Is Predictable Liability 
Predicted? 
 No matter what precautions we take, some readers will misunder-
stand this Article—particularly its proposals about adopting new cate-
gories of false scientific speech liability—as a radical call to “devalue” 
the freedom of speech. Let us be clear: this Article does not suggest that 
the government should restrict more speech. Rather, it urges the adop-
tion of predictable speech liability that should, if anything, heighten the 
freedom of speech and could potentially result in fewer successful First 
Amendment suits. These assurances notwithstanding, many readers 
may remain upset about this Article. Even if they cannot themselves 
articulate why they are distressed, they are not without good reason. 
Indeed, the author himself has concerns about the inherent tensions 
that First Amendment law must in one way or another address. 
 We incompletely sketch these worries below; involved discussions 
could require several articles. From this brief exposé, we hope it will 
nevertheless be apparent that the most trenchant objections to speech 
liability are equally applicable to all legal liability, even when that liabil-
ity is made predictable. 
 Laws work well if they transmit a predictable and correctly per-
ceived signal that indicates which individual behavioral norms people 
should adopt or reject if they wish to avoid similar punishment. (On 
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the flip side of the coin, the absence of legal prohibition on a behavior 
sends a predictable and correctly perceived signal about which behav-
iors are freedoms.) Professor Larry Lessig explains that laws have to be 
subjectively internalized to shape individuals’ behavior.153 
 Stated simply, liability must be correctly internalized as an individ-
ual’s behavioral norm to be effective. Thus, liability is far more than 
just a monetary penalty or incarceration. Liability is speech intended to 
signal what behaviors are socially acceptable and unacceptable. As 
speech, the intended message of any liability (including predictable 
liability) may be misperceived. Consequently, people may misconstrue 
the contexts or behaviors to which liability applies, overestimate or un-
derestimate the amount of liability faced, or disregard or even inten-
tionally flout the threat of liability.154 There are many reasons why even 
predictable liability may not be predicted. One reason in particular is 
common to nearly all liability—enforced laws send a general, well-
perceived, but crude emotional message: “You will be punished for your 
bad behavior.” 
 Whether intended or not, liability criticizes. Liability threatens. 
Liability causes fear. Liability is government-backed intimidation.155 Yet 
Dale Carnegie, a giant in the self-help movement, recognized long ago 
                                                                                                                      
153 Lessig, supra note 149, at 344 (“As a subjective constraint, [laws] constrain[] us be-
fore we act. . . . Law and norms are more efficient the more subjective they are, [and] they 
need some minimal subjectivity to be effective at all.”). 
154 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of 
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 Geo. L.J. 949, 976–89 (2003) (de-
scribing why criminal liability fails to function properly in its intended deterrence role). 
155 Physical intimidation presently receives less First Amendment protection than oth-
er forms of speech, largely because the costs of that speech are believed to outweigh its 
benefits. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 395–96 (1992); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (per curiam). 
Interestingly, emotional intimidation is not itself usually recoverable in tort. See Tiller v. St. 
Louis & S.F.R. Co., 189 F. 994, 996, 1000–01 (W.D. Okla. 1911) (holding no recovery for 
fright attributable to negligent burning of plaintiff’s dwelling); Erlich v. Menezes, 981 P.2d 
978, 987 (Cal. 1999) (“‘[E]motional distress damages in connection with property dam-
ages are not compensable.’” (quoting Blagrove v. JB Mech., Inc., 934 P.2d 1273, 1277 
(Wyo. 1997))). But see Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970) (allowing recovery 
for emotional injuries where negligence caused flooding of house plaintiff had built him-
self), modified by Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 663-8.9 (LexisNexis 2007) (barring liability for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress if based solely on property damage). 
If fear of economic damages were legally compensable, an interesting question would 
arise: could people sue currently litigating parties for provoking specific or general fears of 
being sued? Could people sue for irrational fears of being sued? Note that many irrational 
fears are presently compensable in tort. See Guzelian, Liability & Fear, supra note 56, at 
766–804 (explaining four forms of restrictions to limit liability for emotional harms related 
to physical injury). 
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that humans rarely respond to condemnation in the intended way: 
criticism often fails to create lasting change and instead creates resent-
ment.156 
 Carnegie’s insight about how humans respond to criticism or 
threats applies no less equally to law. A law’s intimidating emotional 
signal can completely block perception of that law’s intended message: 
the unacceptability (or acceptability) of a behavioral norm in a specific 
context. If bombarded with many such emotional signals, people would 
gradually acquire general free-floating anxiety—not necessarily linked 
or restricted to a specific behavior—about their own future liability 
without knowing which “wrongful” behaviors of theirs may trigger that 
future liability. Economists commonly dismiss such fears and resulting 
behaviors as “irrational.” Whether “rational” or not, these feelings oc-
cur, making liability a double-edged sword with an unintended, but 
sharp, emotional edge.157 The upshot of this is that any attempt to im-
pose liability, rather than, say, letting local norms resolve the matter, 
may do more unintended harm than good. In other words, even pre-
dictable liability—a theoretically optimal form of liability—may result 
in unpredicted, harmful results. 
 We also note that commentators complain that law in a globalizing 
world is displacing informal, local social norms as the default norm for 
social interactions.158 If local social norms are waning, and reliance on 
law is increasing, liability’s intimidating emotional signals may be con-
                                                                                                                      
156 Dale Carnegie, How to Win Friends & Influence People 5–6 (rev. ed. 1981) 
(“Criticism is futile because it puts a person on the defensive and usually makes him strive 
to justify himself. Criticism is dangerous, because it wounds a person’s precious pride, 
hurts his sense of importance, and arouses resentment.”). 
157 See Gerald L. Clore, For Love or Money: Some Emotional Foundations of Rationality, 80 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1151, 1152 (2005) (contending that emotions must be taken into ac-
count to complement rational choice theory in formulating a more accurate theory of 
behavior); Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1110, 1111 (2006) (ar-
guing that “cultural cognition” largely results from bounded rationality to the extent it 
produces factual judgments). See generally Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain: The 
Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life (1996) (providing an excellent but 
dated review of neurobiological and psychological evidence about how fear conditioning 
occurs and how people behaviorally respond to fears). 
158 See, e.g., Philip K. Howard, The Death of Common Sense: How Law Is Suffo-
cating America 185–87(1994) (contending that law has gradually displaced social norms, 
leading to confusion and more strife in society); cf. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of 
Cooperation 73–87 (1984) (reporting that frequent rotation of World War I troops 
through raids caused informal cooperative social norms between adversarial forces to col-
lapse); Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 
82–103, 283 (1991) (indicating in empirical case review of cattle grazing that social norms 
can be displaced by legal norms because of people’s unfamiliarity with each other). 
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tributing to a noted increase in social fear, without necessarily creating 
additional safety when people speak or act.159 Moreover, to the extent 
that local norms are still strong and do conflict with law, they may em-
bolden individuals to reject law, or even intentionally flout it.160 
 The upshot of this analysis is that even if law is made more predict-
able (in theory), it is not necessarily assured that people will actually 
predict the legal implications of their behavior and modify that behavior 
accordingly in practice. 
Conclusion 
 False speech is a problem.161 This Article has proposed steps that 
land a first blow in addressing that problem in a predictable fashion. 
Multiple modifications to current legal understandings of “falsity” are 
necessary to achieve this predictability. In particular: (1) focusing on 
audience perception rather than the literal words of speech, (2) estab-
lishing through objective empirical knowledge that a speaker has caused 
injurious false perceptions, (3) modifying legal rules of evidence to en-
                                                                                                                      
159 See Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a 
Big Difference 7–14 (2002) (presenting theory of why epidemics like teen smoking, drug 
use, etc. are not deterred by laws); Barry Glassner, The Culture of Fear: Why Americans 
Are Afraid of the Wrong Things, at xi–xiv (1999) (noting increase in general social fears in 
America). 
160 Robinson & Darley, supra note 154, at 986. The authors state: 
If the community comes to view the law as being irrelevant to justice—or 
worse, as violating justice—then a lawbreaker will not be stigmatized by the 
community. He or she may even be regarded as a Robin Hood, working to 
produce what the community considers to be justice, in defiance of the unjust 
legal system and its enforcers. According to this analysis, distributing punish-
ment in a way that conflicts with shared lay intuitions of justice undercuts the 
criminal law’s moral authority and thereby reduces its crime reduction effect. 
Id. 
161 Although not itself desirable, some false scientific speech is an unavoidable by-
product of any attempt to gain scientific knowledge. In science, false conjectures consid-
ered in isolation are worthless if the goal is truth. The process of gaining scientific knowl-
edge, though, is messy and imperfect and generates many false conjectures because hu-
mans are imperfect. If one forbade the give-and-take of scientific conjectures entirely, 
there would be no way, given our human nature, to identify scientific facts. Thus, the tricky 
goal is to encourage people in some contexts to make absurd or preposterous scientific specu-
lation—understanding that the vast majority of it will prove to be false, and simultaneously 
prevent those untested conjectures from being accepted as certainties or even semi-
certainties until there is sufficient scientific evidence to do so. There are no hard lines in 
the sand in science—the border of practical scientific knowledge is fuzzy. Nevertheless, a 
fuzzy strike-zone does not prevent an umpire from generally calling balls and strikes relia-
bly, nor should fuzzy boundaries of knowledge prohibit the practical delimitation of scien-
tific knowledge in most instances. 
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sure that judicial findings of fact accurately reflect current scientific 
knowledge will all make liability more predictable, and (4) using the 
best available empirical evidence to establish which speeches cause 
avoidable, needless injuries should be done to limit First Amendment 
liability in a predictable fashion. (We call this form of limited liability 
“predictable negligence.”) 
 Taken together, these modifications suggest that special focus 
should be dedicated to false scientific speech, for which predictable 
liability can be most successfully applied. Some commentators suggest 
that there are constitutional barriers to replacing aspects of liability that 
might seem to make this sort of suggestion politically impossible.162 But 
predictable liability—the sole means to upholding the Rule of Law—is 
a concept far older than the Constitution, and one with which the Con-
stitution, properly interpreted, surely does not interfere. What we sim-
ply cannot afford to lose sight of in all of this is that the problem of 
false speech is quite real and has been immeasurably enabled by the 
proliferation of communication technologies. It must be addressed, 
and it must be addressed predictably. Formal, predictable liability for 
false scientific speech is a first step in remedying the currently unpre-
dictable state of First Amendment affairs. 
 No solution is capable of offering us a completely truthful world. 
There will always be liars and bullshitters. But the wonderful advances 
in our scientific knowledge and information technology offer us an 
unprecedented opportunity to advance our collective consciousness, 
and perhaps to leave behind many of the superstitions, prejudices, and 
illusions that have inflamed humanity’s hearts and led to many of our 
most evil deeds since time immemorial. Law should and must reflect 
these advances to remain predictable; if it does not, we risk creating a 
society that will lose respect for the Rule of Law. 
                                                                                                                      
162 Compare John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the 
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 Yale L.J. 524, 583–626 (2005) (arguing that the 
Constitution prohibits certain tort reforms), with Philip K. Howard, A Remedy Without a Wrong, 
115 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 30, 31–33 (2005), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/ 
pdfs/25.pdf (rebutting Goldberg’s article). 
